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The real danger... is the opposite of reductionism: call it complicationism.
1
-Richard Posner
[T~he more [one] accepts as relevant, the less [one]can say at all....
[Tiunnel vision is the price we pay for avoiding total blindness.
2
-Arthur Allen Leff
We must at all costs avoid over-simplification ....
-J.L. Austin

3

[Tihe social sciences... have to deal with structures of essential complexity . .. whose characteristicproperties can be exhibited only by models made
up of relatively large numbers of variables... I prefer true but imperfect
knowledge . . . to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be
false. . . .[Sleemingly simple but false theories may . . . have grave
consequences.
-Friedrich Hayek 4

INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades the methods of inquiry developed
in the social sciences have been broadly incorporated into legal scholarship and law school curricula. In particular, economic principles
are now widely utilized to illuminate relationships that are often ob5
scured by conventional legal categorizations. The incorporation of
economic theory into legal scholarship and education is arguably one

1 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAW

17 (4th ed. 1992).

2 Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REV. 451, 477 (1974).
3

EDWARD HUNDERT, LESSONS FROM AN OPTICAL ILLUSION: ON NATURE AND NUR-

(1995), at Part One frontispiece (quotingJ.L. Austin).
4 Friedrich Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK, 266, 269,
272 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt Leube eds., 1984).
5 One recent study concluded that for the past several decades law-and-economics reasoning "appears to have pervaded about one quarter of scholarship in elite law
reviews." Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 28 (1989). To reach
this conclusion Ellickson surveyed annual volumes of the Harvard Law Review, the
Stanford Law Review, the University of Chicago Law Review, and the Yale Law Journalat
five-year intervals, ending with the 1985-86 issues. Id. at 26-29.
TURE, KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES
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of the two most significant jurisprudential developments over that
6
period.
There now exists a wide-ranging and technically sophisticated
body of legal scholarship that utilizes economic models to explain and
predict the consequences of legal rules, and that applies normative
economic criteria to evaluate alternative legal and institutional regimes. In addition, most major American law schools now regularly
offer at least one upper-level elective course, generally titled either
"Economic Analysis of Law" or "Law and Economics," that reviews the
concepts of basic and intermediate-level microeconomic theory 7 and
applies those concepts to examine and evaluate the core doctrines of
property, contract, tort, and criminal law.8 Such courses are usually
taught by a law professor who has both academic credentials in law
and a substantial graduate school background in economics, generally
a Ph.D. degree. 9 This economics-oriented legal scholarship and the
6 The other highly significant jurisprudential development, in this author's
opinion, is the incorporation into legal thinking of the various branches of "critical
theory," including critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminism.
7 The more basic concepts usually covered are those relevant to the standard
supply-and-demand models of price and output determination. The somewhat more
advanced concepts presented generally include the concepts of producer and consumer surplus, the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria and their normative
premises, the Coase Theorem, externalities and public goods, certain basic statistical
measures, the implications of risk-aversion, cost/benefit analysis, and basic game-theoretic concepts. For a detailed discussion of one professor's attempt to structure such
a course along neoclassical lines, but with due regard given to criticisms of that framework, see Gregory Crespi, Teaching the New Law and Economics, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 713
(1994).
8 The AALS Directory of Law Teachers lists 153 law professors who teach law and
economics courses and notes that 78 of these professors are currently teaching the

subject.

ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW ScHs.,

AALS

DIRECroRY OF LAW TEACHERS

1153-54

(1995-96). This information understates the number of law professors qualified to
teach the subject, and probably the number of courses offered as well, because it
omits many noted law and economics scholars. It also does not reflect the significant
extent to which economic concepts have been incorporated into the teaching of substantive courses at many law schools.
9 There are professors teaching these courses, as well as leading scholars in the
area, who have graduate degrees only in one of the two fields and have through informal study developed the necessary level of expertise in the other field. However, it is
difficult to teach economic concepts effectively if one has not had the opportunity for
the advanced study and teaching of the subject provided by graduate economics programs. It is, of course, a rare person who can effectively teach law courses without
having formal legal training. The standard credentials required today for obtaining a
position at a major American law school that would involve teaching law and economics courses, particularly for a person seeking to obtain an entry-level position, are both
aJ.D. degree in law and a Ph.D. in economics.
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economic analysis of law courses each serve to facilitate understanding
of economic concepts and their applications to legal questions within
the legal community, and together have had a significant influence on
the development of legal doctrines.
This scholarship and instruction has been very broad in terms of
the range of legal questions it has addressed. It has, however, been
relatively narrow in terms of the limited range of economic models
and normative criteria that have been utilized. Almost all of this work
has been based upon highly reductionist neoclassical economic models of human behavior and social coordination that have their roots in
the works of Adam Smith,10 David Ricardo," Alfred Marshall,' 2 and
other 18th and 19th century economic theorists. Despite the persistent criticisms made concerning the unrealistic assumptions and problematic normative standards inherent in the neoclassical approach,
almost all efforts by legal scholars to utilize economic principles still
take place within its confines, and this conventional framework continues to be imparted to law student neophytes in a relatively uncritical fashion.
There exists, however, another approach to economic analysis
that also has its roots in The Wealth of Nations,13 but which is far less
reductionist than the neoclassical approach, and which is the product
of over a century of sustained intellectual development that has proceeded largely independently of neoclassical thought. This is the
"Austrian" approach, which traces its origins as an independent line of
inquiry to the 19th century work of Carl Menger,' 4 one of the recognized instigators of the "marginal revolution" in neoclassical economic theory, 15 and has subsequently been refined and articulated by
10

See, e.g., ADAM

SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH

OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS]; ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (R.H. Campbell et al.

eds., 1976) (1759).
11 DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMYAND TAXATION (J.M. Dent &
Sons Ltd. 1973) (1817).
12 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1961) (1890).
13 SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 10.
14 See, e.g., CARL MENGER, INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS (Louis Schneider, ed. & Francis J.
Nock, trans., N.Y. Univ. Press 1985) (1883); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
(Bert F. Hoselitz, ed. &James Dingwald, trans., The Free Press 1950) (1871); KAREN I.
VAUGHN, AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA: THE MIGRATION OF A TRADITION 12 (1994)
("Modem Austrians of all stripes uniformly trace their beginnings back to the writings
of Carl Menger. . . , and especially to his Principles of Economics.").
15 See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 13.
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such significant intellectual figures as Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, 16
Friedrich von Weiser,' 7 Ludwig von Mises, 18 Friedrich Hayek,' 9 Murray Rothbard,2 0 Israel Kirzner,2 1 Ludwig Lachmann,2 2 and numerous
16 EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERX, THE POsrTrvE THEORY OF CAPITAL (William Smart
trans., G.E. Steichert & Co. photo. reprint 1930) (1891).
17 FREIDRICH VON WEISER, NATURAL VALUE (William Smart ed. & Christian A. Malloch trans., Macmillan & Co. 1893).
18

LUDWIG VON MIsEs, HuMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (3rd ed. 1966).

19 Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, CoLLECrnVsr ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F-A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVoLUTnON
OF SCIENCE (1952); FA. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEn AN ANALYSIS OF
THE THEORY AND PRACICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK,
THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCErr: THE ERRORS OF
SOCIALISM (1988); FA. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (Ist Gateway ed.
1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIALJUSrICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JusnCE F.A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY. THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LmERT RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AN ORDER]; F.A.
HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans.,
1933); FA. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLrIcs, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEw STUDiE];FA. HAYFr
PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); FA. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVTMsrENT (1939); FA.
HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); FA. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(1946); FA. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); FA. HAYEK, STUDrES N PHILOSOPHY, PO/mcs AND EcoNOMICS (1967); FA. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely
read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive
discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are
probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty:
Rules and Order.
20 Murray Rothbard has written extensively on Austrian economics and its political implications. His best known work is his two-volume treatise, Man, Economy and
State, written in 1970. MURRAY NEWTON RoTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A
TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1970).
21 Israel Kirzner has written extensively on questions of Austrian economics. See,
e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITON AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter,
KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DIsCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS
(1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROcEsS: EssAYS IN THE DEVELoPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992); Israel M.
Kirzner, The Economics of Time and Ignorance: Review Essay, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4,

17-18 (1985) [hereinafter Kirzner, Review].
22 Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND rrs
STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPEGTATIONS AND THE MARKET PRO-
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other contributors. 23 While the Austrian approach has not been articulated and applied to the extent that it constitutes a fully developed
alternative to the neoclassical paradigm, 24 it nevertheless presents a
coherent and comprehensive alternative framework which incorporates a number of important insights largely overlooked in most neoclassical theorizing, and which does not rely upon some of the more
unrealistic neoclassical premises.
The Austrian approach has much to offer anyone frustrated with
the limitations of the neoclassical paradigm. While it is perhaps possible to criticize the Austrian approach for tending towards the opposite
vice of "complicationism," 25 a better attitude is to regard that approach as reflecting an inclusive, 'Yin" mode of thinking which complements the more precise but narrower 'Yang" mode of neoclassical
thought. 26 There is of course some heterogeneity of views among Austrian economists (hereinafter "Austrians"), but the extent of their
agreement on core principles overshadows their differences. The
Austrians all demonstrate a much greater willingness than do neoclassical economists (hereinafter "neoclassicists") to confront directly the
difficult theoretical problems presented by the passage of time, the
malleability of preferences, and the pervasiveness of limited knowlcEss:

(1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE
(1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROcEss (1986) [hereinafter LACHmANN,ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An
Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECIONS IN
AusTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, CarlMenger
and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL.ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14J.
ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theoy, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AusTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M.
Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AusTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig
M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll
and Mario Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) -[hereinafter
Lachmann, Review].
23 See, e.g., Roy E. CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALrmES IN AN OPEN
ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AusrilAN PERSPECTIVE (1992); THE ECONOMICS OF LUDWIG VON MISES: TOWARDS A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (Laurence Moss ed., 1976); GERALD
O'DmscoLL & MARio Rizzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE (1985);
VAUGHN, supra note 14.
24 See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at x. But see THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND
DECISIONS (1980), (including text in which the central Austrian concepts are developed in some detail and applied to a broad range of social policy issues).
25 See POSNER, supra note 1, and accompanying text.
26 See generally LAO-TZU, TAO, A NEW WAY OF THINKING: A TRANSLATION OF THE
TAO TE CHING (1975), for the definitive explanation of the principle of
complementarity.
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY

LEGACY OF MAX WEBER
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edge and uncertainty. They evidence a greater recognition of the centrality of market processes, the importance of tacit social institutions
in structuring market orders, and the power of habits and traditions
in shaping behavior. Their analytical methods require little if any facility with mathematical or statistical techniques. Their approach consequently has significant advantages over the neoclassical framework
as a tool for legal scholars to use for aid in understanding, predicting,
and evaluating the operation of legal regimes, although, as will be discussed below, the Austrian approach has certain disadvantages as well.
It also has advantages as a pedagogical framework that can effectively
focus law students' attention upon certain processes and constraints
highly relevant to the operation of the legal system that tend to be
obscured by the neoclassical paradigm.
Interest in Austrian economic theory has grown dramatically in
recent decades, 27 and the level of acceptance of Austrian ideas has
taken another quantum advance with the general collapse of the Eastern European socialist economies, an event that Austrians had long
predicted.2 8 There are now well-regarded Austrian economics graduate programs at two American universities, 29 a Ludwig von Mises Institute has been established at Auburn University,3 0 and "innumerable"
undergraduate courses in Austrian economics are now offered at
American colleges and universities. 31 A comprehensive analysis of decision-making and the American social order that was based largely on
Austrian concepts was published in 198032 and was greeted with criti-

cal acclaim. 33 The widespread interest that this book has stimulated
27 See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1 ("Certainly, the number of books and articles
that take an Austrian view of some issue or another or that make reference to the
views of some well-known Austrian economist have grown dramatically since the early

1970s.").
28 See id. There remains, however, considerable hostility to Austrian economics
among neoclassicists. See also infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
29 See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that these Ph.D. programs, located at
New York University and George Mason University, are long the leading center of
Austrian thought in the United States).
30 See id.

31 See id.
32

See SOWELL, supra note 24.

33 Milton Friedman was quoted on the back cover of
EDGE AND DECISIONS

THOMAS

SowELL, K owt

(2d ed. 1996) ("This is a brilliant book."). See also Peter

Brimelow, A Man Alone, FORBES, Aug. 24, 1987, at 41. ("[Knowledge and Decisions is]
regarded by [Milton] Friedman and other economists as his [Sowell's] single most
important theoretical contribution to their discipline .... ."); Phillip F. Lawler, Dismal
Yes, Science No, POLICY REmIw, Spring 1980, at 164 ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] a
brilliantly original book .... .").
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has resulted in its recent re-publication in a paperback edition. 34 We
may be on the verge of a Kuhnian 35 revolution in economic theory
where the Austrian approach will henceforth share equal billing with
the neoclassical paradigm as complementary frameworks through
which economic analyses may be conducted. If this occurs, it seems
likely that there will be a corresponding expansion in the range of
theoretical perspectives utilized in the economic analysis of law.
Most readers of this Article will probably have at most only a limited familiarity with the Austrian tradition. Therefore, in Part I of this
Article I will describe the main assumptions underlying the Austrian
approach, and contrast those assumptions with the corresponding
premises of the conventional neoclassical framework generally used
for the economic analysis of law. I will then briefly discuss the prospects for convergence of the two approaches. In Part II, I will discuss
and summarize the earlier efforts undertaken by Austrians to apply
their framework to understand and assess the evolution of legal rules
and institutions. In Part III, I will draw upon this prior work in an
attempt to outline the contours of an Austrian approach to understanding the legal system and the process of legal change. In Part IV,
I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the Austrian approach as compared to the neoclassical framework as a basis for legal
scholarship and instruction. In Part V I will present a few concluding
observations.
I.

THE AusTRIAN APPROACH COMPARED TO THE
NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH

Austrian economic theory rests upon a number of fundamental
premises that also underlie the neoclassical paradigm. This is not surprising because both approaches are based upon the work of Adam
Smith and other 18th and 19th century classical economists, and because the Austrian approach did not separate from the classical mainstream until the 1870s. 36 There are, however, some significant
differences between the two approaches. Most importantly, the two
frameworks differ sharply in their treatment of time and uncertainty.
The neoclassical framework, as will be discussed below, largely abstracts from such considerations to preserve analytical tractability and
the ability to generate precise, quantitative predictions and determi34 SOWELL, supra note 33.
35

See generally THOMAS

KUHN, THE STRucruRE OF SCINTIric REVOLUTION

(3d ed.

1970).
36 All Austrians trace the roots of their approach to the work of Carl Menger,
particularly his Principles of Economics. See VAUGHN, supra note 14.
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nate normative assessments. Austrians, in contrast, attempt to incorporate directly into their analyses the consequences of the passage of
time for the preferences, expectations, and extent of knowledge of
economic actors. This difference has significant implications not only
for explanatory and predictive efforts, but also for normative assessment as well.
A.

Shared Premises of the Two Approaches

First of all, Austrian economics shares with its neoclassical competitor the characteristic of being a "theoretical" approach to understanding phenomena. By this I mean simply that both approaches are
based upon the use of simplified logical models of individual human
behavior and social interaction that selectively abstract from much of
the richness and complexity of actual events.
Austrians and neoclassicists differ, of course, in their views as to
which aspects of the world can be abstracted from without vitiating
the relevance of the models for explanatory or predictive purposes.
They also differ in a more subtle way in their views of the purposes
their theoretical models are to serve. Neoclassicists primarily regard
their theories and models as tools for predicting future events. To
them, a good "theory is merely a convenient fiction... which is capable of generating predictions that are more often correct than are
[those] generated by other convenient fictions." 37 Predictive accuracy
is the ultimate value; the degree of realism of those assumptions is a
secondary consideration.3 8 Austrians, in contrast, regard efforts to attempt to predict more than the most general features of future events
as rather dubious, and consequently design their theories primarily to
provide intellectually satisfying explanations of phenomena, rather
than accurate predictions.3 9 They therefore are inclined to favor the
use of much more realistic and complex assumptions in their theories
than are the neoclassicists.
A second central premise shared by Austrians and neoclassicists is
the commitment to "methodological individualism" as the primary explanatory and evaluative principle. Both approaches regard individual human actors as the fundamental loci of choice and action in the
social world, and the welfare of those actors as the appropriate basis
for any normative assessments. In either framework, supra-individual
collective entities such as "markets," "governments," "societies," and
37 Richard B. McKenzie, The Neoclassicalistsvs. the Austrians: A PartialReconciliation
of Competing Worldviews, 47 S. ECON. J. 1, 7 (1980).
38 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN PosrnvTE ECONOMICS 3-43 (1953).
39 See i& at 9.
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the like are regarded as being merely abstract intellectual concepts
that, while often useful for organizing data for particular analytical
purposes, do not possess a "real" ontological status. These supra-individual entities are viewed as derivative social creations that are unable
to act independently of the individual human actors whose thoughts
and behavior create and sustain them, and the consequences of policies for those entities are not accorded any normative significance
apart from their consequences for those individuals.
A third feature shared by Austrian and neoclassical economics is
the assumption of rational individual behavior. Both approaches
posit that people will behave rationally, though not necessarily selfconsciously so, in utilizing their knowledge and available economic
means to best satisfy their preferences. 40 Austrians and neoclassicists
are each confident in the "power and fruitfulness of the rationality
postulate," and both groups generally reject attempts to empirically
test the "assumption of rationality in any experimental setting. '41 The
neoclassicists, however, tend to emphasize somewhat more the consciously rational aspects of human behavior, while the Austrians stress
the importance of tacit knowledge and habitual conformity with institutional routines as a key component of rational action.
Both approaches presuppose scarcity as the fundamental economic problem. Individuals are regarded as faced with the constraint
that their available means are insufficient to achieve all of their desired ends, and thus are forced to "economize" in their deployment of
those means to achieve the greatest total satisfaction possible under
the circumstances. Both approaches, therefore, recognize that tradeoffs are pervasive and unavoidable.
Finally, both the Austrian approach and the neoclassical paradigm give pride of place to the "invisible hand" principle. Central to
both approaches is the insight that a spontaneous order can emerge
in human affairs that was not planned or intended by any person or
group of persons, and that has desirable properties beyond the capability of any group of persons to consciously orchestrate. Both Austrians and neoclassicists see this phenomena manifested most visibly by a
system of free markets, where the structure of relative prices in the
different markets serves to efficiently coordinate the economic activity
40 There is a difference between the two approaches in the justification offered
for use of the rationality assumption. The Austrians regard it as an axiom necessarily
implicit in the concept of human action, where the neoclassicists tend to regard it
more as an instrumental assumption selected for its ability to generate useful predictions. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DuKE L.J. 53, 54 (1992).
41 Karl-Heinz Paqu6, How FarIs Viennafrom Chicago?:An Essay on the Methodology of
Two Schools of Dogmatic Liberalism, 38 KYKLos 412, 420 (1985).
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of many millions of persons in a fashion that would be difficult or
impossible to replicate through central governmental coordination.
Austrians, however, typically are willing to rely upon such spontaneous
orders to achieve more social objectives than are neoclassicists, as will
be discussed below, perhaps because their approach has given them a
greater appreciation of the nature and power of market processes.
B. Differences Between the Two Approaches
Where the two approaches diverge most dramatically is in their
respective treatments of time and uncertainty. The passage of time
must be addressed in some fashion in any theoretical model of economic behavior, because the sought-for results of human actions generally do not occur instantaneously with those actions. There is
usually a period of time that must elapse between when a person
chooses how to deploy his economic means to achieve the greatest
possible satisfaction of his wants, and when this objective is achieved.
The existence of such a time period creates the possibility that the
person's preferences, or his access to economic means, or the extent
of his knowledge as to how such means can be wielded to achieve
maximal satisfaction, will change before his objective is achieved. If
so, that person may, on the basis of this new information or perspective, regard his earlier choices as inferior to those that might have
been made and seek to revise his plans to the extent possible. This is
particularly likely if the person's initial choices were made on the basis
of relatively incomplete information as to the possible uses of his economic means, because under those circumstances the passage of time
is more likely to reveal new and better ways, the available means can
be utilized to achieve satisfactions.
The neoclassical framework abstracts from these difficulties
posed by time and uncertainty in its efforts to predict behavior. This
simplification permits neoclassicists to preserve a level of analytical
tractability that allows for the use of sophisticated mathematical and
quantitative techniques. The conventional foundational assumptions
made in a neoclassical analysis are that persons have stable, exogenously determined preferences that do not change during the period
of time under scrutiny, and that they also have access to perfect information as to available possibilities and constraints when making their
optimizing decisions. Because the problems created by the passage of
time, pervasive ignorance, and uncertainty have been assumed away in
this fashion, the neoclassical models have a simple, determinate structure that allows them to be used to generate "equilibriums"-steadystate results uniquely determined by the original preference and con-
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straint conditions-which can then be compared across different initial preference or constraint sets.
Consider, as the best known example of a neoclassical economic
model, the basic market model of price and output determination
under perfect competition that is at the heart of most neoclassical
analyses. Persons are regarded as coming to such a market with an
exogenously determined wealth endowment and set of preferences
that do not change during the period in which they make their buying
or selling decisions. Furthermore, they come with perfect information as to the (unchanging) set of production possibilities and the
availability and prices of complementary and substitute goods and factors of production. In such a timeless market comprised of all-knowing persons, there is deemed to occur an instantaneous
equilibration. 42 Any shortages or surpluses lead to rapid price adjustments which mesh the competing interests of all these persons into a
supply and demand equilibrium at a single price and quantity, where
the marginal costs equal marginal benefits, and which thereby leaves
no further possibilities for mutually beneficial transactions among the
participants.
The results obtained from such a model are completely determined by its initial conditions, in a fashion quite similar to the results
obtained from the Newtonian models of classical physics. 43 Such
models of the market process of this nature are obviously well-suited
for application of the sophisticated mathematical techniques of constrained optimization. Any set of initial preferences, wealth endowments, and resource and technology constraints can be input into a
simultaneous equation framework to derive the resulting equilibrium
outcome for each actor and for the market as a whole.
42 DANIEL B. SUITS, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 320-43 (2d ed. 1973).
43 This congruence is to be expected, because the visible success of the
Newtonian models is what led economic theorists to design their explanatory schemes
along similarly deterministic lines.
The dominent [sic] school of economic theory in the West, which we shall
call "neoclassical economics," has in the past often been praised and
damned by being held up to the standards of physics ... [Olne rapidly
discovers that the resemblances of the theories are uncanny, and one reason
they are uncanny is because the progenitors of neoclassical economic theory
boldly copied the reigning physical theories in the 1870's. The further one
digs, the greater the realization that those neoclassicals did not imitate physics in a desultory and superficial manner; no, they copied their models
mostly term for term and symbol for symbol, and said so.
PHILLIP MIROWSKI, MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT: ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL PHYSICS: PHYSICS
AS NATuRE's ECONOMICS

3 (1989).
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Here is where the Austrians part company from the neoclassicists.
From their perspective, it makes as little sense to abstract from such
central and ubiquitous features of life as time and uncertainty as it
would to assume away the existence of scarcity.4 While they concede
that such drastic simplifications make analysis much more straightforward and create possibilities for displaying mathematical virtuosity,
Austrians contend that these simplifications defeat the main purpose
of the whole theoretical enterprise, which is to aid in understanding
real world events. 45
Austrians instead start from what they regard as more realistic assumptions. They posit that individuals are malleable in terms of their
preference structures, continually changing their wants as they undergo the experiences of life. 46 They further assume that individuals
hnve nreeqg nt nnv oiven nnint in time to only radicallv incomnlete
44 See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 4.
45 Ludwig Mises, for example, rejected mathematical and quantitative methods as
unsuitable methodologies for economic analysis:
The impracticability of measurement [in economics] is not due to the lack
of technical methods for the establishment of measure. It is due to the absence of constant relations. If it were only caused by technical inefficiency,
at least an approximate estimation would be possible in some cases. But the
main fact is that there are no constant relations. [Austrian] Economics is
not, as ignorant positivists repeat again and again, backward because it is not
"quantitative." It is not quantitative and does not measure because there are

no constants.
HuMAN ACrION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 56 (1949). In his 1974
Nobel Memorial Lecture, Friedrich Hayek offered a similarly critical assessment of the
LUDWIG VON MISES,

use of mathematical methods in economics:
It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as
possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences-an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an approach which
has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude-an attitude which, as I
defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense
of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been
formed."
HAYEvK, NEw STDns, supra note 19, at 23, see also Walter Block, On Robert Nozick's 'On
Austrian Methodology" 23 INQuiRY 397, 398 (1980).
The explanation.., of why people act is teleologica4 they act because they
have purposes which they think can be accomplished if they act. But such a
mode is completely at variance with that which prevails in the natural sciences. There, causality or correlation is all, and teleology is dismissed as a
suspect and illegitimate kind of anthropomorphism.
Id.

46 See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 80.
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knowledge as to existing circumstances, and moreover are highly uncertain in their expectations as to the future course of events. They
believe that to assume away this malleability, pervasive ignorance, and
inherent uncertainty-and also to assume that market outcomes occur instantaneously rather than over a period of time during which
individual preferences as well as opportunities and constraints may
change-serves to obscure the key insight Austrians wish to specially
emphasize. This key insight is that market behavior is best viewed as a
"discovery process," continually generating entrepreneurial opportunities to be seized by alert individuals. It is a process involving trial
and error, engaged in by creative persons having fluid attitudes and
expectations and quite limited knowledge. It is a process taking place
within an evolving institutional framework, rather than a process that
is completely determined by exogenous conditions and that rapidly
converges to a stable equilibrium state. Through their market and
non-market activities, persons obtain feedback concerning their available opportunities and the constraints they must respect. As a result
of this feedback, they may alter their preferences and expectations as
they become aware of new potential satisfactions and new ways to deploy their means to satisfy their preferences. These changes alert individuals to new entrepreneurial possibilities, which will lead some of
them to make behavioral changes to take advantage of these opportunities, and which will in turn impact and influence other market participants and the overall institutional order in a continual
evolutionary process.
This ongoing social "learning" process, and the continual revealing and pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities, is regarded by
Austrians as the central dynamic force underlying the evolution not
only of markets, but also of all other social institutions. They therefore choose to highlight this evolutionary process in their explanatory
models, rather than to obscure it through the use of restrictive, deterministic models that rely heavily upon concepts of stable equilibria
and instantaneous adjustment.
The two approaches also diverge in terms of their assumptions as
to the nature of factors other than preferences, expectations, and the
extent of knowledge of prices and production possibilities. Most significantly, Austrians and neoclassicists regard differently the overarching structure of laws and other social institutions that condition
market behavior and other forms of social interaction. Neoclassicists
generally posit a stable framework of customary practices and legal
rules-particularly the rules governing property ownership and contractual rights-that remains unchanged during the (assumed instantaneous) period during which actors make their choices and obtain
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the results of those choices. From the Austrian perspective, however,
the framework of legal and social institutions is as endogenous with
regard to the social learning process as are individuals' expectations
and the extent of their knowledge. That institutional framework is
viewed as simply another form of spontaneous order that emerges as
individuals attempt to avoid the consequences of their ignorance and
uncertainty. It necessarily undergoes continuous change, as it is simply the result of the behavior of individuals who play various conscious
or habitual roles in its articulation. 47 The outcomes of the market
processes that take place within the confines of the overarching institutional structure change over time as those persons participating in
those processes continually adjust their behavior in light of new information as to the relative prices of goods, services, and factors of production, as well as in response to changes in their preferences and
understanding of production possibilities. The institutional structure
itself similarly undergoes alterations, as those persons whose private
and public behavior constitutes those institutions undergo comparable alterations in their attitudes and knowledge.
From this Austrian perspective, the emphasis neoclassicists place
on the econometric estimation of the various structural parameters of
the economy seems to be a misdirection of effort. Trying to estimate
the parameters of an economy that is in a constant, all-encompassing,
evolutionary disequilibrium is a futile exercise because, in such an
economy, there can be no such parameters; "no static, time invariant
relations."48 Such econometric estimates may be of some assistance
for historical work done in an attempt to establish the connections
that existed among prior events, but they cannot be of meaningful
predictive assistance.
This dramatic difference in the approaches taken with regard to
dealing with the effects of time and limited knowledge in explanatory
models also has major implications for the choice of normative criteria. The neoclassical approach, with its assumptions of exogenous
preferences and stable institutional structures, and its consequent
ability to derive partial and general equilibrium results for various initial conditions, obviously lends itself well to evaluation of policy alter47 There are not two kinds of things-individual actions and institutions. Rather,
they are one and the same, looked at, perhaps, from two different perspectives.
Human history is the story of the unfolding of actions which lead to other actions
which lead to further ones, in a, so far, unending chain. The fact that some commentators have called some of these complex patterns of individual actions "institutions" should not confuse the issue, and lead us to believe that there is anything
apart from such separate human actions.
Block, supra note 45, at 405.
48 Paqu6, supra note 41, at 429.

330

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

73:2

natives by comparing their different equilibrium outcomes with
regard to the degree of preference satisfaction obtained by the affected individuals under the differing constraint sets imposed by those
alternatives. The Pareto improvement 49 and Kaldor-Hicks improvement 50 efficiency criteria naturally emerge as reasonable normative
standards within such a framework, although a complete justification
for the use of either efficiency criterion requires a resort to additional
value judgments beyond those inherent in the neoclassical explanatory framework. The plausibility of the Pareto improvement unanimity criterion, for example, rests upon the anti-paternalistic premise
that each person is properly regarded as the best judge of his own
welfare. 5' The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, however, is an aggregate measure rather than a unanimity criterion, and consequently also rests
upon some additional and more problematic premises concerning the
proper method of valuing of impacts and the appropriateness of imposing uncompensated losses on some persons. 5 2 Despite its shortcomings, however, the latter criterion is widely used to assign
normative significance to the conclusions reached through a neoclassical analysis.
In the Austrian framework, however, there is no assumption
made that either individual preferences or the legal and other social
institutions shaping social interactions will remain unaffected by a policy measure. It is instead assumed that any significant policy alternative will, over time, result in market process-generated learning by
many individuals which will influence their preferences, expectations,
knowledge, and behavior, including those persons whose behavior
provides the overall institutional framework. It is meaningless, from
this perspective, to attempt to assess the consequences of a policy alternative with any yardsticks of "efficiency" that are based upon the
49 A change in the allocation of resources is defined as a Pareto improvement if
at least one person prefers the new allocation over the original allocation, and no
person regards himself as worse off as a result of the new allocation. For a discussion
of the properties and problems of the Pareto improvement criterion, see Gregory
Scott Crespi, The Midlife Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the
Problems of Nonfalsiflability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 231, 234-37

(1991).
50 A change in a resource allocation is defined as a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if
the benefits of the change, as measured by the willingness to pay of the persons benefited, exceeds the costs of the change, as measured by the willingness to pay of the
persons injured. For a discussion of the properties and problems of the Kaldor-Hicks
improvement criterion, see id.
51 See id. at 235.
52 See id at 236-37
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original structure of preferences and institutional framework that no
longer exist once that policy has been implemented.
When Austrian economists offer a normative assessment of a policy, their judgment is not based upon the "efficiency' characteristics
of the resource allocation resulting from that policy, as measured at
any point in time against any particular set of preferences and constraints. 53 Their assessments focus instead on the impact of the policy
measure at issue upon the processes through which individual learning
and behavioral changes take place over time, and upon the institutional structure which shapes and guides those processes. 54 In other
words, their normative assessments are grounded in their conclusions
as to the relative impacts of policy alternatives on the degree of freedom accorded to persons to utilize markets and other social institutions as means of identifying and seizing entrepreneurial
opportunities, broadly defined, and for correcting their prior mistakes
and reducing their ignorance, rather than with regard to the relative
level of preference satisfaction obtainable at any point in time under
those alternatives.
Why do the Austrians so favor market processes? Obviously such
processes are not endorsed for their own sake, but for their perceived
desirable effects upon individual persons. Value judgments external
to their explanatory models concerning what effects upon persons are
desirable are therefore necessarily implicit in the Austrian normative
criteria, just as in the case of neoclassical normative assessment
through the use of efficiency criteria. The central value premise embraced by Austrians is individual freedom from domination,5 5 which
they regard as best furthered by pervasive and clearly demarcated private property rights and reliance upon consensual market processes
for social organization. A related and subsidiary evaluative criterion is
whether a proposed policy will ultimately work to facilitate the free
53 But see infra notes 121-50, 207-12 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of Roy Cordato and Linda Schwartzstein to develop an efficiency criterion

grounded in Austrian premises).
54

See infra text accompanying notes 285-88.

55 Mises "defines freedom as that state of affairs in which the individual is free in
the sense of being free to choose between various actions within a market economy.
The government is to be confined to the protection of people against the violence or
aggression of other individuals." ALEXANDER H. SHAND,FREE MARET MORAI. THE
PoLTIcAL ECONOMY OF Tm AusTRIAN SCHOOL 94-95 (1990). "Freedom is the
predominent [sic] value in Hayek's social and economic philosophy...." Id at 97.
"[Rothbard contends] that freedom is meaningfully definable only as absence of interpersonal restrictions .... [Rothbard states that] 'it is the free market in a free
society that furnishes the only instrument to reduce or eliminate poverty and provide
abundance.'" Id. at 109.
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market discovery process by which price data and other crucial economic information is disseminated and entrepreneurial opportunities
are perceived and taken advantage of.56 This second criterion rests
upon the implicit premise that the ultimate consequences of the entrepreneurial dynamism unleashed by free markets will necessarily be
of general benefit to humanity in terms of increasing levels of satisfaction of wants. Some Austrians have argued, however, that this premise
57
is potentially open to refutation.
C.

The Prospectsfor Convergence of the Two Approaches

One of the major current debates among Austrians is whether the
prospects for eventual incorporation of Austrian principles into the
mainstream neoclassical framework in a fashion that does proper justice to the central Austrian insights are promising enough for that
reconciliation to be actively pursued. 58 Israel Kirzner, one of the leading active Austrians, has attempted to develop a model of the entrepreneurial process that captures the emphasis Austrians place upon
market discovery processes and individual uncertainty, yet is sufficiently formalized to be incorporated into neoclassical market models
of optimization under exogenous constraints. 5 9 Other prominent
56
57

See Cordato, supra note 23, at 62-63.
See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 147.
If entrepreneurs can be wrong, not in the simple sense of missing opportunities but in the far more important sense of using resources in ways that lead
to losses, how can they be seen as the unequivocal driving force bringing the
system toward equilibrium? If they can be wrong, perhaps they can be a
destabilizing influence on the market and perhaps that instability can persist
for long periods of time.

Id.
In other words, rather than entrepreneurs having only the effect of arbitrageurs who reduce price differentials and thus smooth fluctuations and
imbalances, they may at times act in a discoordinated group fashion to push
markets further out of balance, at least temporarily, until their collective error becomes apparent. For example, the Austrian view of the monetary disturbance-generated business cycle assumes that entrepreneurs in the capital
goods industries will collectively overreact to the fall in interest rates caused
by an expansion in the money supply, which will lead to a subsequent discoordination between the production of investment and consumption
goods. See Edwin Dolan, Introduction to THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AuSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Edwin Dolan ed., 1976). There is therefore both a
"boom" and a "bust" period generated by entrepreneurial behavior during
such a business cycle, rather than a simple move towards equilibrium.
58 See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1-9, 162-78; Kirzner, Review, supra note 21,
at 1-4, 17-18; Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 1-4, 17-18 (1985).
59 KIRZNER, COMPETITION, supra note 21.
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Austrians such as Ludwig Lachmann, Mario Rizzo, and Karen Vaughn,
however, have criticized such efforts to "domesticate" Austrian concepts for neoclassical absorption as resulting in essentially deterministic models that inadequately embody the central Austrian notion of an
economic and institutional world in continual flux, and that consequently are unable to explain certain important and pervasive realworld phenomena. 60 While certain recent developments in neoclassical theory could be viewed as attempts from the "other side" to incorporate to some extent the central Austrian insights, 61 the general
60 See LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS, supra note 22; ]; VAUGHN, supra note 14, at
162-78; Mario Rizzo, Afterward to AusTRIAN ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND NEW DiRECTIONS 245, 246-47 (Bruce J. Caldwell & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Rizzo, Afterward].
61 For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market
processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW (1994); Jason ScottJohnston, StrategicBargainingand the Economic Theory
of ContractDefault Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615 (1990).
In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g, 2 HERBERT ALExANDR SIMON, MODELS OF BoUNDED RATIONALIY
(1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1974);
Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economics," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the
difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g, Socio-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHEsis (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional
Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996);
RIcHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. W4TER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE

(1982).

Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and
Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought
upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position
taken in the socialist calculation debate);JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMIrsTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Economic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of
exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize
in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian
economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense."
VAUGHN,

supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
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intellectual climate among mainstream economists has always been
relatively hostile to Austrians, and perhaps has become increasingly so
in recent years. 62 This hostility stems largely from a widespread perception that Austrian economics is "unscientific" because of its refusal
to adopt the mathematically-oriented stable preferences/constrained
6s
maximization/equilibrium methodology favored by neoclassicists,
which is even regarded by some neoclassicists as more determinative
of economics as a discipline than is its ostensible subject matter.64 Neoclassicists are likely to continue to reject any aspects of Austrian theory that require them to discard the equilibrium concept and thus
lose the ability to utilize mathematical techniques to generate determinate results.
It thus appears that Austrians are fated to remain outside of the
neoclassical mainstream, and consequently their efforts would probably be better spent in further refinement and articulation of their own
explanatory models. In the spirit of this enterprise, I will outline in
Part III below the general contours of an Austrian explanatory framework that could aid in understanding the legal process. In setting
forth these principles, I will attempt to remain faithful to the Austrian
conception of a social world driven by individual actions taking place
over time, under circumstances of malleable preferences, extreme ignorance, pervasive uncertainty, and institutional flux. Before engaging in this theoretical effort, however, in Part II below let me first
discuss and summarize some of the prior work that has been done by
Austrians that most directly applies Austrian concepts to questions of
legal design and evolution.
II.

PRIOR EFFORTS TO APPLY AusTRiAN CONCEPTS TO

LEGAL QUESTIONS

From the Austrian perspective, a society's "legal system" has no
existence independent of the subjective perceptions and conduct of
the individuals that constitute that society. Austrians define such social institutions functionally and tentatively, remaining cognizant of

the fact that they are simply abstract categories used as organizing
concepts for thinking about certain of the more regular and predictable aspects of individual behavior. In other words, the fundamental
62 "The intellectual climate in the mainstream of the [economics] profession has
become increasingly hostile to Austrian economics." Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60,
at 246.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 247 (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)).
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reality is that the overall social process through which persons interact
over time, with certain aspects of their behavior having sufficient persistence and regularity to create and sustain enduring "institutions"
rather than being merely transient and unique episodic phenomena.
Further, regularized behavior that relates directly to the actual or potential use of coercion, and that takes place in a particular context
where most individuals generally acquiesce to such coercion as a legitimate exercise of authority, can be collectively described as a "legal
institution," and the set of all such legal institutions might be collectively labeled the society's "legal system."
Given their holistic view of the social process, it is not surprising
that Austrians have tended to address legal questions only tangentially
in the context of broader analyses of social and political processes and
institutions, rather than as separate issues. However, some Austrians,
particularly some of the more recent writers who have legal backgrounds and who target their work primarily at an audience of legal
scholars, have written articles that while grounded in the holistic Austrian perspective focus primarily upon legal issues of a more narrowly
defined character.
Let me first outline in relatively broad terms in Section A below
the general position traditionally taken by Austrians with regard to
legal questions. I will then turn in Section B to some more recent
Austrian work that has been published largely in mainstream legal
journals, and which focuses more closely upon the kinds of questions
of primary interest to legal scholars. Finally, in Section C, I will discuss an influential and widely-read book by Thomas Sowell which
broadly applies Austrian themes. After summarizing and critiquing
these more recent efforts from an "internal" Austrian perspective, I
will then attempt to set forth the general contours of a framework for
addressing legal issues that rests upon Austrian principles, which can
also serve as an introductory pedagogical vehicle for teaching law students how to engage in the economic analysis of law.
A.

The TraditionalAustrian Stance on Legal Questions

To the extent that the major Austrian writers such as Mises,
Hayek, Rothbard, and others have addressed legal questions, they
have done so primarily from a normative rather than a descriptive or
explanatory perspective. The dearth of attempts to utilize the Austrian framework to explain how legal and political institutions come
into being and evolve is one of the major deficiencies of Austrian
literature.
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As noted earlier, the primary normative commitment shared by
Austrians is their embrace of individual freedom from domination as
the ultimate value. It is generally taken as a second article of faith that
the greater the degree of freedom of contract accorded market participants, and the more stable and predictable the regime of property
rights, the more dynamic will be the entrepreneurial market process,
the more rapid will be economic growth, and the more individual welfare will ultimately be enhanced. 65 The Austrian writers taking normative positions have therefore consistently endorsed those kinds of
legal and political regimes that they view as both enhancing individual
freedom and furthering the market process. Such regimes include: 1)
stable and comprehensive regimes of property rights that internalize
as many of the consequences of behavior as reasonably possible, given
the costs and inherent limitations of governmental action, 66 2) freedom of contract, and 3) governmental intervention into private affairs, other than the definition and protection of property rights and
enforcement of contracts, being limited to at most arranging for the
availability of those public goods not suitable for provision through
private market mechanisms. 67 The ideal state that those writers envision is one that is profoundly neutral and is not linked to the purposes
of any one social group, but simply provides a stable framework of
rules and arrangements under which people can pursue their own individual aims without coming into conflict with one another.
However, there have been very few attempts to explain the contours and evolution of the legal framework over time through the use
of the same explanatory framework used by Austrians to explain the
dynamics of the market process. Much of the Austrian normative writing suggests, at least implicitly, that a structure of legal rules can be
formulated by persons of good intentions, and then imposed upon
the market process from "the outside," so to speak, and subsequently
operate as a purely exogenous constraint on that process. 68 This view
65 But see VAuGHN, supra note 14, at 143, 146-47.
66 Some recent Austrian writers, however, are quite skeptical regarding the ability
of the government to assemble the information necessary to accurately "internalize"
the impacts of behavior that are not priced through markets. See, e.g., CORDATO, supra
note 23, at 15-27.
67 But see id. (arguing that Austrian premises do not support government inter-

vention to facilitate the provision of public goods).
68 Friedrich Hayek took the following position concerning the proper role of the
judge in a legal dispute:
In this [judging] it will often be impossible to distinguish between the mere
articulation of rules which have so far existed only as practices and the statement of rules which have never been acted upon before but which, once
stated, will be accepted as reasonable by most. But in neither case will the
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of the legal and political system, however, is radically inconsistent with
the basic Austrian position as to how the evolution of social institutions in fact occurs.
In the general Austrian explanatory framework, all legal rules
and institutions, as well as all other social institutions, are treated as
endogenously determined as part of the ongoing social process. Persons come to the markets and their other social interactions with malleable preferences, limited information, and pervasive uncertainty. In
response to the circumstances they encounter, they act in rational
fashion to maximize their satisfactions. One form of action is to attempt to utilize coercion to achieve one's ends. As persons interact
with one another their exercise of actual or threatened coercion tends
to become regularized over time-through the processes of victory,
defeat, and mutually advantageous accommodation and compromise-into various institutional forms that might collectively be labeled the "legal system." Some persons gravitate towards social roles
where their behavior is often significant for the operation of this legal
system, such as the roles of judges, legislators, attorneys, and police.
Others may play more indirect roles where they generally attempt
merely to accommodate to the patterns of coercion imposed by the
legal system as they perceive them, rather than seek to actively maintain or influence those patterns. As any individual alters his coercionrelated behavior in entrepreneurial fashion in response to changes in
his preferences or to new information or constraints, these alterations
in a small way influence the operation of this legal system, which then
has feedback effects upon that person and other individuals.
The contours of a legal system thus evolve endogenously over
time in the same fashion as do markets and other social institutions.
Given this fact, any efforts to influence the development of a legal
system can only have their impacts through their contribution to this
same dynamic process. From this Austrian perspective as to how social change occurs, normative declarations by an individual as to the
nature of an "ideal" legal system will have no impact upon events except insofar as those declarations alter some individual's behavior.
Moreover, the behavioral changes they motivate will then interact with
a myriad of other behaviors in a very complex fashion where even the

judge be free to pronounce any rule he likes. The rules which he pronounces will have to fill a definite gap in the body of already recognized
rules in a manner that will serve to maintain and improve that order of actions which the already existing rules make possible.
HAYEK, RuLEs AND ORDER, supra note 19, at 56.
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general direction of change, let alone the ultimate result at any subse69
quent point in time, is difficult or impossible to predict.
In light of its core commitment to dynamic explanations of events

that they believe better reflect the true circumstances facing individuals than do static neoclassical explanations, and their emphasis of the
unpredictability of future events, the Austrian normative literature has
a strangely disembodied, ex cathedra quality to it that does not mesh
well with those principles. 70 Beyond offering a few unsubstantiated
claims that governmental efforts to intervene into the workings of free
markets will tend to "snowball" into more extensive interventions until
full socialism is established, 71 Austrians traditionally have not made
serious efforts to identify the crucial points of leverage in the network
of social institutions where attempts to reshape the legal and political
order are likely to have significant and beneficial consequences, nor
have they attempted to bring their energies to bear at these points in
furtherance of their normative agenda.7 2 However, some of the more
recent Austrian writers whose work will be discussed below have shown
69 It could well be that theorizing as to the optimal contours of legal regimes,
such as the major Austrian writers have done extensively, might not be a particularly
effective way to bring about such regimes. Moreover, the ultimate consequences of
such theorizing could be to move the legal institutions in the wrong direction, given
the particular dynamic of counter-responses and adjustments that might be triggered
by the behavior inspired by those theories.
70 This problem has been noted by other observers. See, e.g., McKenzie, supra
note 37, at 11.
Austrians are primarily interested in discussing the broad outlines of a Lockian-style social contract that will maximize individual freedom .... However,
much of the discussion of social contracts appears to be conducted on the
assumption that the contract, once devised, will be fully operative. Any dispute which may arise subsequently to the adoption of the contract can be
settled with reference to rules laid down within the contract. There is a presumption, in other words, that rules for maximizing individual freedom and
minimizing collective action can be constructed and can form an effective
barrier against subsequent efforts by special interest groups to distort the
substance and meaning of the adopted rules. Austrians seem... to presume
that the economic forces which make a social contract necessary in the first
place are held in check by the social contract that is developed.
Id.
71 See e.g., MIsEs, supra note 18, at 855-61.
72 Other observers have also noted and been critical of the dearth of Austrian
attempts to operationalize their explanatory models through empirical research. See,
e.g., Paqu6, supra note 41, at 426.
The central question for [Austrian] economics, then is whether, how, and
how quickly individuals become successful entrepreneurs by discerning past
errors and inefficiencies and correcting their resource allocation
accordingly.
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a greater interest in formulating explanatory schema that could link
the more abstract and general Austrian normative commitments to
recommendations for specific action.
B.

More Recent Austrian Writings on Legal Questions

Over the past two decades a significant number of scholars have
produced some interesting work in the Austrian tradition which bears
more directly upon legal questions than did the more general, economics-oriented writings of their predecessors, and which is addressed
primarily to legal scholars rather than professional economists. I
would like to briefly discuss the work of nine Austrian writers in particular: Mario Rizzo, Gerald O'Driscoll, Christopher Wonnell, Roy
Cordato, Michael Debow, Thomas Arthur, Linda Schwartzstein,
Michael Spicer, and Thomas Sowell. I will discuss the first eight of
these authors' works in that order, since it roughly corresponds to the
chronological order of their major contributions. I will then turn in
Section C to a more extended discussion of Thomas Sowell's work.
1. Mario Rizzo
During the early 1980's Mario Rizzo carved out a niche for himself in the mainstream lawjournals in which he developed a recogniz73
ably Austrian approach to the economic assessment of tort law.
While those articles addressed a number of issues, his major Austrian
Unfortunately, Austrian economics at its present stage of development
looks very much like a programme without research. While the fundamental
points of departure from mainstream economics have been repeatedly formulated, there has so far been no serious attempt to operationalize the ideas
in a full-scale empirical research project. This is probably due to two facts:
the traditional Austrian scepticism [sic] concerning empirical research, and
the nature of the required research project itself which would have to fall in
the no man's land between social psychology, sociology, and economics.
Until the Austrians overcome their reluctance to start empirical research on
the dissemination of information, their progaunme is stuck.

Id.
73 See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL
STuD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law
Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword:
Fundamentals of Causation, 63 Gm.-KENr L. REv. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid
flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980)
[hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An
EconomicFramework, 15 GA. L. REv. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage ofEfficiency, 8
HoFSTRA L. REv. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAny
AND DIsEQU.B~uM: EXPLORATION OF AusTuAN THEms (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979);
Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
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theme was that if judges were to attempt to follow the recommendations of many law and economics scholars to utilize economic efficiency as a criterion for deciding tort cases, they would first have to be
able to calculate the appropriate efficient shadow prices-the prices
that would be established in hypothetical zero transaction cost markets in a state of economy-wide general equilibrium-for the rights
subject to litigation. However, to Austrians the inherent limitations of
human knowledge and the continual and unpredictable dynamics of
technological change make this an impossible task, and therefore an
unwise pursuit.7 4 On this basis Rizzo argued that strict liability was
preferable to negligence as a general standard of liability, since it
would provide greater certainty for individuals attempting to plan
their conduct by saving courts and litigants the difficulties of having to
grapple with issues of foreseeability, cost avoidance capability, and the
like.

75

As a leading Austrian theorist, Rizzo was certainly aware that from
the Austrian perspective of a world in continual and total flux the
concept of "economic efficiency" is meaningless, since it is predicated
upon the neoclassical assumption of stable preferences and institutional structures that are unaffected by the decision being assessed.
However, he apparently elected not to emphasize in his writings this
more fundamental critique of attempts to utilize the efficiency criteria
to shape tort law. Rizzo also co-authored with Gerald O'Driscoll the
important Austrian treatise The Economics of Time and Ignorance.76 That
work will be discussed below in connection with the examination of
O'Driscoll's other writings.
2.

Gerald O'Driscoll

In 1980 Gerald O'Driscoll contributed a review essay titledJustice,
Efficiency and the Economic Analysis of Law to a symposium issue of the
Journalof Legal Studies.77 That essay was written in response to an arti74 [T]he substantial information requirements that must be satisfied in order to
identify efficient rules make efficiency impractical as a standard. Unless the efficiency theorists can show how courts can overcome the difficulties... they will
continue to argue for a norm that has little operational content. It is all too easy
to show that efficiency leads to desirable results within simplified constructs; it is
quite another thing to show what this has to do with the world in which we live.
Rizzo, Mirage, supra note 73, at 658.
75 Rizzo, Law, supra note 73, at 317.
76 O'DRiscoL. & Rizzo, supra note 23.
77 Gerald O'Driscoll, Jr., Justice, Efficiency, and the Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment on Fried, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (1980).
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cle by Charles Fried,7 8 but went well beyond commenting on Fried's
piece to offer an Austrian perspective on the controversy regarding
the question of the efficiency of the common law.
In his essay, O'Driscoll emphasized the point made earlier by
Mario Rizzo that even if judges were in fact attempting to promote
economic efficiency in their rulings, they could not do so successfully
since they as well as other individuals must act on the basis of very
incomplete knowledge.7 9 He drew a close parallel between the difficulties facing a judge who might try to mimic the "efficient" allocations that would result from a hypothetical market and the insoluble
"socialist calculation" problem8 0 extensively and convincingly discussed by Ludwig Mises in the early 1920s. 8 1 He also critiqued the
position he attributed to both Charles Fried and Richard Posner that
all rules of conduct can be "rationally reconstructed," and that this
fact is their only claim to validity.8 2 In his view, if one accepts this
position concerning the ultimate rationality of rules one is encouraged to (wrongly) view all social institutions as deliberately
designed.8 3 O'Driscoll argued instead in true Austrian fashion that
laws and morals are better regarded as spontaneously emerging social
institutions, somewhat akin to language, rather than conscious human
creations. 84 He therefore rejected the ideas implicit in much of the
law and economics literature that the analysis of law should be regarded as a subset of the theory of rational choice, and that law can be
85
explained as the pursuit of any single goal.

O'Driscoll also co-authored with Mario Rizzo The Economics of
Time and Ignorance,86 which stimulated a well-publicized controversy
among Austrians as to the merits of seeking closer reconciliation with
neoclassical theory as opposed to developing an independent paradigm.8 7 While that book was intended as a comprehensive restatement and clarification of Austrian economic theory, and dealt only
78

Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal

History, 9J. LEGAL STUD.

335 (1980).

79 O'Driscoll, supra note 77, at 356-57.
80 See id. at 359.
81 See, e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM (J. Kohane trans., MacMillan Co. 1936)
(1922); Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculationin the Socialist Commonwealth, in CorLEcTrIVsr ECONOMIC PLANNING 87 (F.A. Hayek ed., 1938).
82 O'Driscoll, supra note 77, at 364.

83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
O'DmscoLL & Rizzo, supra note 23.
87 See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 133-38; Kirzner, Review, supra note 21, at
1-4, 17-18; Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 1-4, 17-18.
86
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tangentially with legal issues, it nevertheless did provide some valuable
insights concerning how Austrian concepts might be applied to examine questions of legal process. In particular, it suggested the use of
a concept of "pattern equilibrium" that might facilitate Austrian analysis without abandoning its basic premises.
Both Austrians and neoclassicists refer to themselves as "subjectivists."88 O'Driscoll and Rizzo in their book described the Austrian sub-

jectivist position as a "dynamic subjectivism" that recognized the
creativity and non-determinate nature of human choice, while claiming that the neoclassicists embraced a "static subjectivism" which recognized only the subjectivity of individual preferences, and which
modeled choice as simply constrained maximization.8 9 They also
drew a distinction between the Austrian concept of "real time," in
which learning continually takes place as a result of experience and
leads to alterations in behavior, and the "Newtonian time" concept
that characterizes neoclassical models in which the outcomes are completely determined by the initial conditions. 90
The book emphasizes the importance of knowledge in economic
behavior, and discusses the context, acquisition, role in market
processes, and multi-faceted nature of knowledge. 9 1 In the authors'
view it is not useful to conceive of the economic system as setting
down to an equilibrium position. 92 The future is always uncertain,
and the consequences of action are always speculative. Social institutions and rule-following behavior are evolved responses to the uncertainties people face and the pervasiveness of unintended
consequences. Institutional regularities and entrepreneurial actions
serve to reduce the discoordination that results from individuals each
acting with incomplete knowledge and uncertainty, but this discoordination can never be completely eradicated. 93 The endogenous nature of preferences and knowledge in real time means that one
cannot use end-state standards such as "efficiency" to judge market
94
outcomes.
88

See O'DRiscoLL & Rizzo, supra note 23, at 1.

89

See id. at 17-33.

90 See id. at 52-70.
91 See id. at 35-51.
92 [M]arket activity ... can be rendered intelligible as a process of attempting to
correct errors and coordinate behavior....
...[But] [t]here is no stable endpoint to which the process must lead, nor a
single path that it must follow.
Id. at 5.

93 See id. at 77-78.
94 See id. at 90.
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O'Driscoll and Rizzo made a major-and controversial9 5-concession to the neoclassicists by stating that it was necessary for the Austrian framework to incorporate some concept of equilibrium if it was
to be successfully used as a tool of analysis. 96 In the most innovative
portion of their book they attempted to develop a kind of equilibrium-like analytical notion that did not abstract from either real time
or ignorance, and that did not impose the kind of end-state determinateness that Austrians objected to in neoclassical equilibrium concepts. They coined the terms "pattern coordination" and "pattern
equilibrium" to describe an ongoing but essentially orderly state of
affairs that still permitted the emergence of unexpected and undetermined behavior. 97 Once this state of pattern equilibrium is reached
among a group of individuals, the regularized features of human conduct that are manifested in social institutions and other patterns of
rule-following behavior would be relatively predictable and coordinated, while unpredictable actions could still occur within the bounds
of these regularities.
The authors conceptually separate behavior into its "typical" and
"unique" features. 98 The "typical" aspects of behavior are those that
are relatively stable and time-independent, while the "unique" aspects
of behavior are those that are highly time-dependent. 99 A pattern
equilibrium is a situation where the plans of individuals are coordinated with regard to their typical features, even if their unique aspects
fail to mesh. 10 0 This pattern equilibrium does not have the deterministic properties of the neoclassical equilibrium concept. Some of its features are relatively stable, while others may vary over time. In the
short run, the typical institutional patterns of conduct are affected
only by exogenous shocks to the system, while the unique aspects
change endogenously within the system.' 0 ' In the authors' view, this
concept of a non-deterministic pattern equilibrium is useful because it
95 See, e.g., Lachmann, Review, supranote 22, at 17.
96 The absence of any tendency to change is incompatible with real time.
Yet... some idea of equilibrium is important. Indeed, it would be difficult to
imagine a viable economics without one.
O'DRIscoLL & Rizzo, supra note 23, at 71.

In the broadest sense, equilibrium is inextricably linked to the causal
mode of reasoning.... [W] e believe that some concept of equilibrium is an

indispensable ingredient in all economic explanations.
Id. at 85.
97 See id at 85-88.
98 See id at 76-79.
99 Seeid.
100 See id. at 85.
101 See id. at 87.
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allows analysts "to model adjustments in a way that does not foreordain their outcomes. ' 10 2 It thus may provide a workable means of setting some bounds upon the framework of Austrian analysis so as to
avoid total indeterminacy of results.
3.

Christopher Wonnell

As far as I am aware, Christopher Wonnell has only published
one piece of scholarship that invokes Austrian themes.10 3 That article
is significant, however, for it represents the first time that a legal
scholar has presented in a mainstream lawjournal a law and economics analysis of contract law based on Austrian principles.
Wonnell's article invokes the Austrian perspective to illuminate
the issues raised by the long-standing tension between freedom of
contract and the allowance of excuses from contractual obligations
based upon impossibility, fraud by non-disclosure, or unconscionability. 10 4 The article demonstrates a solid grasp of the main precepts of
Austrian theory, and an appreciation of the nature of the dynamic
process of entrepreneurial discovery that Austrians regard as central
to social progress. The piece does unfortunately evidence some confusion regarding the Austrian view of efficiency, 10 5 and consequently
See id. at 88.
Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54
FoRDHAM L. REV. 507 (1986).
104 See id. at 508.
105 As has been discussed earlier in this article, Austrians assume that preferences
are malleable and often change over time. Hence, they regard as rather meaningless
neoclassical calculations as to the "efficiency" of rules, since those calculations are
based upon an assumption of unchanged preferences over the period of analysis.
Austrians in their normative assessments consequently emphasize the impacts of policies upon the entrepreneurial market process rather than comparative evaluations of
end-states of the economy at different points in time. However, they do not generally
utilize the term "efficiency" as a metric for assessing the impacts of proposed measures upon the market process. The following excerpts from Wonnell's article suggest
that he has failed to fully appreciate this point:
The law-and-economics school can be criticized for.., assuming the unspoken norm that economic efficiency is a desirable goal. The difference between neoclassical economics and the Austrian school, however, concerns
positive analysis, not the desirability of particular ends .... [I]t is assumed
without much argument [for this article] that efficiency is in fact a good
thing.
102
103

The Austrian critique of neoclassical economics, if accepted, tends to
alter the raison d'etre of the free market and freedom of contract. In general terms, freedom of contract is no longer defended because it produces
perfect efficiency. Rather, freedom of contract produces more efficient out-
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offers some inapt comparisons of the comparative efficiency of neoclassical and Austrian prescriptions. 10 6 Wonnell also fails, as unfortunately do most Austrian writers, to offer evidence establishing the
necessary connection between measures that facilitate entrepreneurship and the resulting enhancement of overall social welfare. However, despite these minor deficiencies the paper presents an
interesting and insightful examination of the normative positions generally taken by law and economics scholars with regard to the impossibility, fraud by non-disclosure, and unconscionability defenses in light
of the Austrian emphasis on the significance of the entrepreneurial
07
role.1
The conventional neoclassical analysis of the impossibility doctrine concludes that courts should apply this doctrine so as to allocate
the risk of unforeseen supervening contingencies to the superior ex
ante risk bearer.' 0 8 Wonnell invokes Austrian themes to argue that
this analysis fails to recognize adequately the nature and predicates of
entrepreneurship. 10 9 He concludes that the impossibility doctrine
should instead be applied in a fashion that takes pains to avoid dis' 0
couraging acts of "entrepreneurial perceptiveness." "1
He conducts a similar analysis to criticize the conventional law
and economics framework first articulated by Anthony Kronmani n
for determining when a person should be excused from a contractual
duty on the basis of a failure of the other party to disclose information. Wonnell argues that Kronman's well-known dichotomy between
"deliberately acquired" and "casually acquired" information" 2 fails to
reward entrepreneurial skill in perceiving useful opportunities to acquire valuable information, even in seemingly "casual" settings, and
that the impact upon entrepreneurial incentives as well as upon persons engaging in routine information-search cost calculations should
be taken into account in determining liability." 3 Entrepreneurial accomes than does judicial or legislative intervention, and outcomes that are
increasingly efficient over time.

Id. at 510, 524-25 (footnotes omitted).
106

"[T]he Austrians believe that freedom of contract leads to an increasingly effi-

cient economy...." Id. at 542.
107 Id. at 525-42.
108 See Richard Posner & Andrew Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6J. LEGAL SUD. 83 (1977).

109 See Wonnell, supra note 103, at 525-26.
110 See id.
at 526-27.
111 See Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information and the Law of Contracts,7
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
112 See id.
at 16.
113 See Wonnell, supra note 103, at 528-31.
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quisition and subsequent non-disclosure of valuable information, even

if seemingly casually acquired, should be regarded as the creation of
114
value, rather than fraud.
Wonnell then addresses the question of the proper scope of the
unconscionability defense. He first considers the enforcement of the
terms of standard form contracts. 1 5 He finds there to be much less
divergence here than for the impossibility and fraud by non-disclosure
doctrines between the conclusions reached through neoclassical and
Austrian analyses. He concludes that the ability to conceal terms in
inaccessible fine print is not vital to ensure adequate entrepreneurial
incentives. 116 He does express concern, however, that an overly broad
application of the unconscionability doctrine by the courts, so as to
make large numbers of duties non-disclaimable, would be a serious
mistake. From the Austrian perspective, the profit opportunities created by one-sided contracts will tend to encourage entrepreneurs to
enter the relevant markets, and thereby reshape the prevailing contractual terms into a better balance, or at least depress prices obtained
by the exploitative parties. 11 7 The Austrians generally see no advantages in enforcing hidden contract terms, according to Wonnell, but
are primarily concerned that the remedial government intervention
8
not be a cure that proves to be worse than the disease."1
Finally, Wonnell considers how the unconscionability doctrine
should be applied in settings other than the form contract context,
such as when the prices charged by one party are significantly higher
than those generally prevailing in the market, or are set monopolistically, or when certain non-price terms are unfair." 9 His general conclusion is that from an Austrian perspective these other abuses are
likely to be rapidly self-correcting-in a way thatjudicial errors usually
are not on the same time scale-as consumers learn from their experience of these abuses and thus become better able to avoid them, and
as new entrepreneurs avail themselves of opportunities to compete ad2°
vantageously with the abusive firms.1
Wonnell's article is a valuable contribution to the law and economics literature. This is so not only because of its specific insights
concerning the doctrines he considers, but also for demonstrating
how a conventional law and economics analysis of legal issues can be
114
115
116

See id. at 530.
See id. at 530-35.
See id&at 530.

117
118
119
120

See
See
See
See

id. at 531-33.
id. at 533.
id. at 535.
id. at 536.
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greatly enriched by incorporating the Austrian insights concerning
the market process and the important role of entrepreneurship.
4.

Roy Cordato

Roy Cordato in 1989 contributed a short article to a Hamline Law
Review symposium that addressed questions of welfare economics and
efficiency analysis from an Austrian perspective. 12 1 He first critiqued
the standard neoclassical Pigouvian 12 2 and Coasian 123 approaches that
are used for determining how to deal with the problem of externalities in a manner that will encourage efficient behavior.' 2 4 The bases
for his criticisms are the Austrian ideas that one cannot properly overlook the subjective nature of costs nor the passage of time in defining
125
efficiency criteria, as do these two approaches.
Cordato then attempted to develop an Austrian concept of "social efficiency" that properly incorporated the subjective nature of
costs and the dynamics of the passage of time.12 6 Building upon prior
work in that area done by Israel Kirzner, 127 he concluded that "the
efficiency of the economic system is judged [from the Austrian perspective] by the extent to which it encourages individuals to pursue
their own goals efficiently."' 28 Such "social efficiency" is maximized by
a set of "legal institutions that minimize conflicts in the use of resources and allow the economic system to maximize the dissemination
29
and use of knowledge."'
Cordato endorsed the conclusions previously reached by Kirzner
concerning the institutional framework most conducive to achieving
such "social efficiency": a stable and comprehensive framework of
property rights and free markets. 130 In his view, such a framework
J121 Roy Cordato, Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the Economics of Harmful Effects,
12 HAMLnm L. REv. 229 (1989).
122 See generally KC. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). The
Pigouvian approach to externalities focuses upon the use of taxes or subsidies to align
the marginal personal costs and benefits of an action to the actor with its marginal
social costs.
123 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).

The Coasian approach to externalities focuses upon achieving social wealth maximization. This approach assigns the property right to the party to a dispute concerning
the use of the property who places the highest value on that property right.
124 See Cordato, supra note 121, at 229-36.
125 See id. at 235-36.
126 See id. at 237.
127 See id. at 239. See generally KIRZNER, MARKET THEoRY, supra note 21.
128 Cordato, supra note 121, at 239.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 239-40.
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maximizes the extent to which the price system can disseminate relevant information among individuals, and yet still provides the necessary degree of "institutional certainty" to enable people to plan their
future conduct.1 3 1 He also joined Mario Rizzo 13 2 in concluding that
from this perspective strict liability has advantages over a negligence
33
standard because of the certainty it provides.'
In 1992, Cordato published a book in which he further developed these basic ideas.' 3 4 He there renamed the concept that he had
labeled "social efficiency" in his earlier article to "catallactic efficiency," thus embracing the idea first put forth by Friedrich Hayek
that the social order is better conceived of as a "catallaxy" rather than
as an economy. 135 The efficiency of a catallaxy, according to Cordato,
"is to be judged by the extent to which the catallaxy encourages individuals existing in a social context, to pursue their own goals as consistently as possible." 13 6 Questions of catallactic efficiency must "focus
13 7
upon the institutional setting in which individual actors operate."'
Cordato stated that there are "two overriding issues" relevant to
determining the degree of catallactic efficiency that exists at any point
in time. 38 The first issue has to do with the extent to which the insti39
tutional setting facilitates the use and discovery of information.
The second issue concerns the extent to which that institutional set131 See id. at 240-41.
132 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
133 See Cordato, supra note 121, at 241-42.
134 See CORDATO, supra note 23.
135 See id at 58. A "catallaxy" is defined by Cordato as "a social order generated by
the market activities of separate individuals and organizations, each pursuing their
own purposes." Id. This term "catallaxy" is preferred to the term "economy" by a
number of Austrian writers, including Friedrich Hayek, who originally coined the
term:
The spontaneous order of the market resulting from the interaction of
many... [smaller economic entities such as households or farms] is something so fundamentally different from an economy proper that it must be
regarded as a great misfortune that it has ever been called by the same
name. I have become convinced that this practice so constantly misleads
people that it is necessary to invent a new technical term for it. I propose
that we call this spontaneous order a catallaxy in analogy to the term "catallactics," which has often been proposed as a substitute for the term
"economics."
Friedrich Hayek, The Principlesof a Liberal Social Order, in THE
367 (C. Nishiyama & K. Leube eds., 1984).
136 CORDATO, supra note 23, at 62.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139

See id. at 62-63.

ESSENCE OF HAYEK
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ting "will allow individuals to gather the necessary physical resources."1 40 Cordato then argues that a catallaxy can only have
desirable individual resource-gathering properties if conflicts over the
uses of resources are minimized through a legal regime that upholds
private property rights and allows freedom of exchange. 14 1 The catallaxy will similarly have desirable information use-and-discovery
properties only to the extent that the price mechanism is allowed to
work freely to signal information as to preferences, resource availability, and the like. 1 42 Entrepreneurs will respond to these price signals
by discovering and exploiting opportunities for profitable arbitrage
and in so doing increase the plan coordination of market
participants.

14

The key contrast between Cordato's "catallactic efficiency" and
the concepts of Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as defined
under the neoclassical approach is thus that while the neoclassical efficiency criteria each focus upon the properties of an end-state equilibrium, catallactic efficiency "is construed in terms of an open-ended
process of pursuing goals."' 44 From the Austrian perspective outcomes cannot be preordained, but the degree to which the institutional setting best facilitates the process of individual goal-seeking can
14 5
be evaluated against the benchmark of an ideal institutional setting.
Cordato's concept of "catallactic efficiency" as a proposed Austrian measure of a society's dynamic ability to continually facilitate the
coordination of individual behavior with minimal conflict is interesting, but raises a number of difficult questions that he fails to adequately address. 14 6 Consider, for example, if one were to attempt
along these lines to determine whether a policy or practice would re140

See i at 63.

141 See id.
142 See id. at 64.
143 See id. at 48; see also KMRZNER,

COMPETrION, supra note 21, at 222:
Each entrepreneurial discovery represents alertness to a hitherto unperceived interpersonal opportunity-an opportunity that depends on the
coordinated plans of two separate individuals. As this "general" equilibrating process proceeds by competitive-entrepreneurial alertness, it identifies
more and more uncoordinated situations, at the same time spreading the
information perceived by entrepreneurial alertness among wider and wider

circles in the market.
Id. But see CORDATO, supra note 23, at 50-54 (recognizing that entrepreneurial activity can have discoordinating consequences for some third parties).
144 CORDATO, supra note 23, at 64.

145 See id. at 65.
146

See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 96-97 (1992) (dis-

cussing some of the difficulties raised by this concept).
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suit in a "Pareto-catallactic efficiency improvement," in the sense of
increasing the ability of one or more individuals to coordinate their
behavior with other persons, or allowing them to do so equally effectively but with less conflict, without creating any additional impediments for any other persons. To make such an assessment one would
have to measure such changes in coordination abilities and in the
level of conflict for each affected individual. This raises first of all a
timing problem, because privileging any one particular point in time
as the definitive benchmark for making the catallactic efficiency assessment of a policy that has continuing dynamic consequences seems
to violate the spirit of the Austrian commitment to full incorporation
of the consequences of the passage of time.
Perhaps more importantly, from the Austrian perspective one
would have to concede that it would probably be impossible ever to
assemble in one place the massive amounts of information that would
be needed to make such an assessment for each of the numerous persons affected by any significant policy or practice. Finally, even if this
information could be obtained, such a Paretian unanimity criterion is
14 7
unlikely ever to be satisfied as a practical matter.
Moreover, any attempt to determine an aggregate measure of the
catallactic efficiency of a policy or practice that was analogous to the
neoclassical Kaldor-Hicks criterion would pose not only the time of
measurement problem and massive information gathering difficulties
noted above, but also would raise the troubling issue of choosing an
aggregation methodology. Suppose a policy or practice did improve
the ability of some groups of persons to coordinate their behavior
with minimal conflict, but made it more difficult for some other persons to achieve their objectives? 14 8 How are such diverging impacts to
be valued and meshed into an aggregate assessment of catallactic efficiency consequences? The Austrian insistence on the dynamic evolution of individual preferences over time clearly rules out the use of a
neoclassical-style "willingness to pay"-based aggregation formula that
assumes as a predicate stable preferences. The Austrian commitment
to a subjectivist perspective, for that matter, makes it particularly diffi-

147

See Crespi, supra note 49, at 234-35.

148 It is easy to envision circumstances where a greater degree of coordination
among some persons would impose greater difficulties upon others. For example,
consider where a firm's potential competitors are now excluded by the firm's more
coordinated relationships with its suppliers or customers, or where a greater degree
of coordination among competitors through cartel arrangements or other collusive
practices would impose added burdens upon customers.
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cult to develop any acceptable aggregation formula. 14 9 However, without some aggregation methodology, it would be impossible to ever
assess the relative "catallactic efficiency" of alternative legal or institutional regimes, rendering the concept rather useless.
In his 1992 book, Cordato also developed in more detail an Austrian approach to the question of externalities. He dealt separately
with negative and positive externalities, and contrasted the positions
taken by both Mises and Rothbard on these questions with those
taken by Hayek, choosing to side with the former writers where they
disagreed with Hayek. 150
Cordato is in accord with all three of the above writers in asserting that the existence of negative externalities is a non-problem if
property rights are well defined. Those persons adversely affected by
an individual's exercise of his property rights are free to contract with
him in the market to have him cease or alter his behavior. If they
choose not to do so, then they have simply foregone one of their market options. The fact that their failure to do so may be because of
high transaction costs rather than costs of another sort is of no particular significance, and does notjustify governmental intervention, even
if the government had access to accurate information concerning the
size and distribution of these transactions costs, which is most unlikely
to be the case. 51
Mises and Rothbard take a similar position with regard to positive
externalities, arguing that their presence by definition can never be
established. This is so because if contractual internalizing arrangements were made among the affected parties-the only actions that
would evidence such external impacts-then the benefits of the action would no longer be external to the decision maker. Speculative
arguments as to the existence of positive externalities that are not correctable by market transactions because of high transactions costs can
149 But see Dominick T. Armentano, one of Roy Cordato's mentors, who wrote the
foreword to Cordato's book, and who apparently endorses an aggregation methodology for a catallactic efficiency criterion that completely ignores the consequences of

certain actions-specifically business collusion agreements-upon persons not party
to those agreements, leading to a rather radical endorsement of collusive practices:
From a catallactic perspective the issue of social efficiency would be seen

very differently. In the first place it would be impossible ... to conclude that
business collusion reduces social welfare .... [A]l business mergers and all
joint ventures would be seen as socially efficient arrangements ....Finally,
the traditional antitrust concern with market share, concentration, and "en-

try barriers" would be seen as entirely misplaced.
Dominick T. Armentano, Foreword to CORDATO, supra note 23, at xii.
150 CORDATO, supra note 23, at 15-27.
151 See id- at 16-23.
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never be a sufficient cause for governmental intervention, since that
152
intervention imposes real, tangible costs.

Hayek, however, took a position on this question much closer to
the traditional neoclassical stance, arguing that the government would
have to intervene where the market fails to provide certain services
such as defense, education, roads, and flood protection because of the
inability of providers to charge the beneficiaries; in other words,
153
where the "free-rider" and "pure public goods" problems arise.
Cordato sides with Mises and Rothbard and against Hayek on this
issue. He believes that Hayek's position here is inconsistent with his
analyses in other areas which emphasize the lack of governmental
knowledge of individual preferences absent demonstrated market actions. 154 Cordato argues that from an Austrian perspective one simply
cannot infer from a person's failure to participate in a market transaction the basis for that refusal. Since it can never be determined that a
contractual arrangement that would have internalized external benefits would have occurred, but for transaction costs, Cordato concludes
that it is improper for the government to act on that unfounded
155
assumption.
The Mises/Rothbard position embraced by Cordato, that governmental intervention to internalize benefits is per se illegitimate, is
quite interesting, and obviously would have momentous implications
if adopted. It would have been helpful to the reader of his book had
Cordato gone further and discussed in somewhat more detail the Austrian view concerning the likely practical consequences of complete
governmental withdrawal of financial support from national defense,
education, public infrastructure, and the like, and in what ways and
how quickly market processes would likely adjust to such changes.
Finally, Cordato succinctly summarizes the differences between
the Austrian and the neoclassical Coasian positions concerning the
resolution of disputes concerning property rights. 156 In his view, the
focus of an Austrian inquiry into such a dispute is the issue of who had
the rights in question prior to the dispute. 15 7 Once that is determined, the dispute is to be resolved by affirming that prior right. Stability of ownership is the paramount concern. It is irrelevant what the
consequences of such a resolution are for social wealth, or whether
152
153
154
155
156
157

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 23.
id. at 24.
id. at 24-25.
i& at 23-27.
id. at 92-110.
id. at 99.
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the parties will be impeded by high transaction costs from contracting
around a resolution of the dispute that fails to maximize social wealth.
A Coasian inquiry, according to Cordato, is based on very different premises. In sharp contrast to the Austrian approach, it essentially
ignores existing property tides, and focuses solely upon prospective
social wealth maximization considerations in determining which party
should be allocated the rights at issue. 158 From an Austrian perspective, such an approach is morally dubious, requires information that is
generally unavailable to the decision maker, and also sacrifices catallactic efficiency by creating uncertainty of title which impedes planning efforts. 159
Cordato's work is quite helpful for one attempting to think
through the normative implications of the Austrian approach. His
discussions of Austrian recommendations concerning governmental
responses to externalities and the contrast between the Austrian and
Coasian perspectives on property disputes make clear some of the significant policy implications of the Austrian perspective. He has also
made a valuable contribution by raising the important question of the
possibility of formulating an Austrian normative criterion that would
play a role in that framework analogous to the function served by the
efficiency criteria in the neoclassical paradigm, and by identifying the
sorts of information dissemination, plan coordination, and conflict
minimization features of social life that an Austrian would wish such a
criterion to incorporate.
Cordato has not, however, addressed a number of very significant
difficulties that the development of a conceptually adequate and operationally feasible Austrian criterion of "catallactic efficiency" or "social
efficiency" would entail. His proposed criterion is in full accord with
the usual Austrian normative commitments to private property- and
free market-oriented legal regimes, but it is not clear what such a
vague criterion would contribute to policy analysis beyond generally
16 0
reaffirming those normative commitments.
5.

Michael Debow

In 1991 Michael DeBow wrote an article in which he utilized an
Austrian approach to consider the merits of proposals to modify the
158 See id at 100.

159 See id. at 105-08.
160 But see Armentano, supra note 149, at xii, where he regards the catallactic
efficiency criterion as going much further than earlier normative declarations and as
excluding consideration of the impacts of collusive business arrangements upon third
parties.
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antitrust laws and merger guidelines to allow a government-implemented and coordinated national "industrial policy." 161 His conclusions, not surprisingly, were that such policies would almost certainly
fail because of the inadequate knowledge and improper incentives of
162
the government bureaucrats who would have to implement them.
DeBow described the Austrian framework as a "disequilibrium"
theory, and emphasized the nature of market competition as a discovery process whereby entrepreneurs have the incentives to discover and
act upon valuable information. 163 He argued more generally that the
use of the Austrian framework for policy analysis is particularly useful
for helping people to avoid the "Nirvana fallacy" of contrasting realworld market imperfections with the hypothetical results of governmental interventions to correct those imperfections that are based on
an assumption of perfect knowledge and disinterestedness on the part
of governmental officials.16 4 The emphasis Austrians place on the limits of knowledge and the importance of preserving entrepreneurial
incentives to discover and act upon new information serves to highlight the weaknesses of governmental mechanisms that attempt to supersede markets.
To DeBow, use of the Austrian approach thus serves a function
somewhat akin to that provided by the "public choice" perspective on
governmental actions. 165 It actually contributes broader insights than
that latter framework, however, because it directly addresses the information problems as well as the incentive problems inherent in government action. Moreover, while public choice analysis still utilizes the
conventional neoclassical constrained optimization equilibrium
model, albeit in the context of non-market behavior, the Austrian
framework is not so limited and allows consideration of the structural
ignorance that public officials must confront in dealing with non-market contexts. 16 6 In DeBow's view, therefore, the Austrian approach
provides a uniquely valuable framework for policy analysis that is particularly helpful in identifying when a call for intervention is moti161 Michael E. Debow, Markets, Government Intervention, and the Role of Infor7nation:
An "AustrianSchool"Perspective,with an Application to MergerRegulation, 14 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 31 (1991).
162 See id. at 91-95.
163 See id. at 57.
164 See id. at 39-42.
165 See, e.g., JAMES M. BucHANAN & GORDON TuuLocK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BuREAucRAcY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcrION (1965).
166 See PeterJ. Boettke, Hayek's The Road to Serfdom Revisited: Government Failurein
the Argument Against Socialism, 21 E. ECON. J. 7, 19 (1995).
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vated primarily by redistributive motives rather than a desire to
correct a market failure. 167
Antitrust law and policy, perhaps more than any other field of
law, rest upon an understanding of the nature of the competitive process and its economic consequences. Given this fact, one might expect antitrust scholars to be more receptive to the idea of deemphasizing the neoclassical paradigm and making more use of the
Austrian approach than any other group of legal academics. DeBow's
article is a major step in this direction, and his discussion of Austrian
methodology subsequently contributed to Thomas Arthur's reliance
upon essentially Austrian notions of competition in a major article
68
written in 1994 for the New York University Law Review.'

6.

Thomas Arthur

Thomas Arthur's article sets forth a comprehensive and highly
critical assessment of the United States Supreme Court opinion issued
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.'6 9 Arthur evidences a clear awareness of the limitations of the neoclassical model
of perfect competition as a framework for understanding real-world
competitive circumstances.' 7 0 Drawing extensively for support from
the work of the Austrian writers Michael DeBow,' 7 ' Friedrich
Hayek, 172 and Israel Kirzner, 173 and upon related ideas found in the
work of Frank Knight, 74 Joseph Schumpeter, 175 and Oliver William167 See DeBow, supra note 161, at 96.
168 Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1 (1994).
169 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
170 "The all-out pursuit of perfect competition ... cannot produce sensible results
for antitrust law. Perfect competition is unattainable in the real world .... Many
practices challenged under the antitrust laws are in fact attempts to economize on the
costs of coordinating interdependent economic actors in a complex economy." Arthur, supra note 168, at 3-4.
[T]he [perfectly competitive] model provides only a snapshot of an endstate. The only process it admits is pricing according to its assumptions. It
cannot explain competition as we commonly think of it, as rivalry among
business firms, nor can it explain innovation and entrepreneurship. It tells
us nothing about the conditions necessary for economic progress.
Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
171 Id. at 10 n.30, 11 n.33.
172 Id. at 11 n.33.
173 Id. at 11 n.33, 12 nn.38-39.
174 Id. at 11 n.31.
175 Id. at 11 nn.32, 34, 12 nn.40-43.
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son, 1 76 he develops a rich concept of "rivalrous competition" 177 which
embodies the major Austrian insights concerning the nature of the
competitive process. 178 He then applies that concept to critique the
reliance of the Kodak Court upon the perfect competition model as a
normative framework for assessing the legitimacy of certain business
179
practices and market structures.
One could perhaps disagree with my characterization of Arthur
as an "Austrian." He never so describes himself in that article. Moreover, while he is forthright in arguing for the use of an Austrian-style
model rather than a neoclassical model of the competitive process in
the antitrust area, he does express some reservations concerning the
wisdom of the larger Austrian project of more broadly displacing the
neoclassical paradigm from its position of preeminence as a framework for general, theoretical inquiry. 180 However, Arthur clearly fa176 Id. at 11 n.35.
177 Id. at 11.
178 This concept of rivalrous competition has important virtues which perfect competition lacks. First, the concept accepts the 'market imperfections' which prevent the full achievement of perfect competition and admits the real world
competitive activities absent in the artificial world of perfect competition and monopoly: advertising, marketing, product differentiation, price cutting, entrepreneurship, business associations, complex products, relational contracts, and, most
importantly, innovation and change. It recognizes that rivals compete on far
more than just price. In particular, it accepts the reality that in a world of imperfect information, consumers cannot afford the unbounded rationality of economic man, who considers every piece of relevant information before making an
economic decision. Instead, real-world economic actions can only be boundedly
rational; consumers acquire and use information only so far as the benefits from
doing so outweigh the costs of acquiring and considering it.
Second, rivalrous competition does not suggest that rivalry itself is always desirable. In the real world not all rivalry is productive ....
Third, competition as rivalry recognizes that despite the epithet 'market imperfections,' product variety and asset specificity are in fact essential to economic
progress ....

Fourth, rivalrous competition emphasizes that markets seldom are in the
equilibrium states described by the perfect competition and monopoly models, in
which the course of competition already has been run. Instead, there exists a
dynamic process of rivalry in which entrepreneurs seek to discover new profit
opportunities in a world of ignorance, risk and uncertainty.
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
179 See id. at 13-14, 42-76.
180 "Despite its oft-criticized unworldliness, perfect competition remains the
model of choice in mainstream economics, due to its superiority over its more 'realistic' rivals in providing useful generalizations and testable propositions." Id. at 7.
Despite the greater descriptive accuracy of rivalrous competition, the perfect
competition and monopoly models dominate mainstream microeconomics.
Notwithstanding the limitations of its assumptions-indeed, because of
them-perfect competition has served economic science well as a model.
Rivalrous competition has not. In accepting the particularizing realities of
the competitive world, it lacks the rigor and generality necessary to generate
testable propositions and provide useful generalizations. Moreover, the de-
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vors using the Austrian approach rather than the neoclassical
paradigm to resolve the policy questions that he addresses in his article, so I feel justified in including his work with that of the more
overtly Austrian writers discussed in this Section. 18 '
7. Linda Schwartzstein
Linda Schwartzstein is one of the few active legal scholars who
deals primarily with Austrian themes in her work. She has in recent
years written two articles for mainstream legal journals that address
the issues raised from an Austrian perspective. 18 2 In a 1992 article,
Schwartzstein compared the premises of the Austrian framework of
analysis with those that define the ideologies that underlie the competing Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and neoclassical law and economics approaches.' 8 3 The main point of the article was that while the
Austrians share with the CLS school the view that law is essentially
indeterminate, 8 4 they do not see this indeterminacy as being un186
bounded'8 5 as is generally claimed by CLS adherents.
Austrians view the law as a spontaneous and evolving order, and
187
not primarily the result of the designs of judges or legislators.
Legal rules evolve both from customary practices and from actions
taken by judges and legislators to fill perceived gaps.' 8 8 While the
legal order is therefore to some extent indeterminate, Austrians see
"this indeterminacy as simply a part of the evolutionary process, and
viations from perfect competition's assumptions are often insignificant. Its
predictions hold true in a wide array of real world situations.
Id. at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
181
Despite its invaluable use as a scientific model, perfect competition is a
treacherous normative guide for economic regulation ....[I]t cannot be
emphasized too strongly that perfect competition is an artificial, abstract
model which can exist only in theory. It cannot be attained in the real world
at any cost. It simply is not possible to eliminate the market "imperfections"
that are abstracted out of the model.
Id. at 13-14.
182 See Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process, 55 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1049 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartzstein, Legal Process]; Linda A. Schwartzstein,
Austrian Economics and the CurrentDebate Between CriticalLegal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HoFsRAi L. REv. 1105 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartzstein, CurrentDebate].
183 See Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1105.
184 See id. at 1127-28.
185 See id. at 1128.
186 See, e.g., MARm KELmAN,A GumE To CmRIcAL LEGAL STUrEs 66-67 (1987).
187 See Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1127-28.
188 See id. at 1128.
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not a cause for despair. 1 89 She provides an apt quote to this effect
from the Austrian economist Don Lavoie:
A spontaneous order is not designed and never really under our
control, since it evolves according to a logic all its own. This does
not mean, however, that we are utterly helpless to exert influence
over the workings of such ordering processes. Its order may be intelligible in terms of general principles, and these principles may
well show us that some environments are more conducive to its selfordering process than others. Understanding a spontaneous order
may enable us to tailor the general conditions for its flourishing. 190
Schwartzstein also recognizes that Austrians do not view the economy as being in an equilibrium state, and that a number of Austrians
go even further than this and totally reject the use of a concept of
19 1
equilibrium in economic analysis.
Schwartzstein further elaborated on these Austrian themes in a
1994 article that presented a comprehensive view of the legal process. 192 That later work represents the most ambitious attempt yet undertaken in a law journal article to apply the Austrian insights to
understanding the contours and evolution of the legal system. The
article first discusses the conventional law and economics view of the
legal process, focusing on the common law efficiency hypothesis. 19 3
She concludes that this literature has yet to develop a consensus on
the nature of the legal process, particularly with regard to whether the
common law tends to promote efficiency, 194 but also with regard to
the relevance of the public choice model of legal processes. 195 She
189

Id. at 1131.

190 Don Lavoie, Economic Chaos or Spontaneous Order? Implicationsfor PoliticalEconomy of the New View of Science, 8 CATOJ. 613, 621 (1989), quoted in Schwartzstein, Current
Debate, supra note 182, at 1135.

191 Schwartzstein, CurrentDebate, supra note 182, at 1129; see also Murray N. Rothbard, Comment: The Myth of Efficiency, in TIME, UNCERTAIN-Y, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 90
(Mario J. Rizzo ed., 1979), at 90.
[T] he individual's ends are not really given, for there is no reason to assume

that they are set in concrete for all time. As the individual learns more about
the world, about nature and about other people, his values and goals are
bound to change. The individual's ends will change as he learns from other
people; they may also change out of sheer caprice. But if ends change in the
course of an action, the concept of efficiency-which can only be defined as
the best combination of means in pursuit of given ends-again becomes
meaningless.

Id.
192

See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182.

193 Id. at 1051-57.
194 Id. at 1060.
195 Id at 1061.
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then argues that the Austrian framework can help to fill this 'jurispru96
dential void" in the law and economics literature.
Schwartzstein regards Fredrich Hayek as the Austrian economist
who has devoted "by far" the most attention to legal issues, 197 and
presents a succinct summary of his legal views. 198 She emphasizes the
fact that Hayek argued for an evolutionary theory of social institutions, regarding them as developing as a result of human action, but
not of human design, 199 and claiming that institutions that function
well will survive and displace less successful competitors. She also emphasizes that Hayek called for social changes to be made only on an
incremental, organic basis, and that he regarded it as an act of hubris
2 00
to attempt to engage in large-scale institutional redesign.
Hayek favored the spontaneous, unintended order of the com201
mon law over the conscious and detailed commands of legislatures.
His view of the ideal form of law was that it would consist of rules that
were general and abstract and applied to all,20 2 although he recog-

nized that some laws by their nature will necessarily apply only to one
group of persons. He endorsed laws of the latter category "if they are
equally recognized as justified by those inside and those outside the
group" affected.2 03 Abstract rules, however, leave individuals a wide
zone of discretion within which they can act creatively. These rules
will thus often result in unforeseen consequences. Hayek therefore
implicitly rejects the idea that the law will necessarily tend towards any
particular result, including economic efficiency. Only experience can
20 4
show the value and consequences of a law.

196 Id- at 1062.
197 Id.
198 Id at 1062-66.
199

See FRIEDRIcH HAYEK, THE CONSTrrUTION

OF LIBERIT

35 (1960).

200 See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1063; see also HAYEK, supra
note 199, at 69-70.
What we must learn to understand is that human civilization has a life of its
own, that all of our efforts to improve things must operate within a working
whole which we cannot entirely control, and the operation of whose forces

we can hope merely to facilitate and assist so far as we understand them.
Our attitude ought to be similar to that of the physician towards a living
organism: like him, we have to deal with a self-maintaining whole which is
kept going by forces which we cannot replace and which we must therefore

use in all we try to achieve.
Id.
201
202
203
204

See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1063.
See HAYEI, supra note 199, at 155.
Id-at 154.
See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1065.
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Schwartzstein recognizes that while Hayek clearly viewed law as
an evolutionary process, and was willing to offer normative criteria for
assessing the legitimacy of particular rules, neither he nor his successors explain the precise process by which the evolution of law and
legal institutions takes place. 20 5 As I have noted earlier, this is a persistent shortcoming of the Austrian literature. 20 6 In the latter part of her
article Schwartzstein attempts to begin to fill this gap.
She commences this effort by first addressing the question of the
appropriate normative standards to apply in assessing legal rules. She
states that if one is to analyze "law as a process, similar to the Austrian
market process" this requires one to focus "on law as a creative and
cognitive discipline." 20 7 She then asserts that a "major goal of the process is to reduce uncertainty while being able to accommodate
change.'20 8 Legal institutions are thus to be positively regarded for
facilitating of the ability of individuals to achieve their goals "to the
extent they clarify the terms under which people interact in the market."20 9 She states that the legal system "must reduce uncertainty and
convey information to the people who need it,"210 and that "Austrians

2' 11
believe that the purpose of the law is to foster certainty.
Schwartzstein thus clearly endorses using the criteria of certainty
and flexibility as metrics to evaluate the rules that emerge from the
legal process. She does not, however, explain how these criteria are to
be reconciled into an aggregate measure in circumstances where
achieving more of one quality appears to be possible only at the expense of trading-off some of the other quality, as may often be the
case. Moreover, this description of the reduction of uncertainty as a
"major goal of the [legal] process" and the assertion concerning what
the legal system "must" accomplish to be judged adequate is an unusual way for an Austrian to speak. Such claims are inconsistent with
the central Austrian premise that only individuals have goals and purposes, and that it is a category mistake to so personify an abstract social institution. It would have been more in the Austrian spirit for
Schwartzstein to simply state that she favors the facilitation of market
processes, and that she regards laws that provide certainty without unduly sacrificing flexibility as conducive to that end. This commitment
to market processes, and her opinion as to their necessary legal predi-

205
206
207

See id. at 1066-67.
See supra text accompanying note 65; see also Paqu6, supra note 41.
Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1068.

208 Id.
209 Id.
210
211

Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1078.
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cates, are beliefs that are certainly shared by most Austrians as well as
by many other people. However, the assumption that those legal
predicates are somehow "goals" of the "legal system" that it "must"
accomplish does not mesh well with the methodological individualism
that underlies the Austrian framework of analysis.
Schwartzstein then turns to the more difficult task of formulating
an explanatory model of the legal process along Austrian lines. She
first notes that since Austrian principles suggest that the evolution of
social institutions is not wholly determined by exogenous constraints,
one should not rely upon deterministic neoclassical theories of prediction or explanation to understand such institutions.2 12 She then
takes some preliminary steps towards developing an interesting model
of the legal process that characterizes it as though it was constituted by
a series of courthouse "markets," with the lawyers engaged in litigation
playing the crucial entrepreneurial roles and the judges acting as their
"customers. 218
Drawing a parallel between the legal process and the market discovery process, she describes lawyers as acting in entrepreneurial fashion as they look for new opportunities to advance their clients'
interests by finding new winning arguments or interpretations of
law. 21 4 By so doing, they place pressure on the judges to extend the

law to cover new situations, and so provide the dynamic element of
the legal process.2 1 5 Judges, as well, play somewhat of an entrepreneurial role, as they are alert for opportunities to make new law
in a fashion that wins approval from the legal community and thereby
enhances their reputation. Their flexibility to play this entrepreneurial role, however, is more restricted than that of the lawyers
because of the general expectation thatjudges will exercise caution in
endorsing innovative arguments and interpretations, and will respect
2 16
previously existing rules.
An entrepreneurial lawyer who successfully advances a new legal
theory, or who develops a new legal specialization, thereby gains a
competitive advantage over his rivals. Those rivals will seek to replicate or overcome this advantage by also making use of the new arguments and developing expertise in the new specialty, or both. In so
doing, they will extend the scope of the new law and the breadth of
the new specialty, thus creating further opportunities for innovation.
212
213
214
215
216

See id. at 1069-70.
Id. at 1071-72.
See id at 1071.
See id.
See id.
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The cycle of innovation, service differentiation, and competitor imitation that characterizes competitive markets thus also characterizes the
judicial aspects of the legal process.
Just as customers in the marketplace discipline entrepreneurship
by failing to reward unpopular innovations, therefore imposing losses
on unsuccessful entrepreneurs, so too do the courts discipline entrepreneurial lawyers by rejecting many of their proposed theories
and interpretations. 217 Thus, while lawyers are the dynamic element
that drive the evolution of the judicial aspect of the legal process, the
judges provide the conservative, institutional regularities that preserve
certainty and continuity in the law, and thereby temper the en21 8
trepreneurial drive.
While her depiction of the litigation process in Austrian market
discovery process terms is very insightful, Schwartzstein goes too far
with her subsequent claims that "the legal process tends to maximize
certainty,"21 9 and that the degree of certainty that will be provided by
this process will depend "on the type of issue that needs resolution." 220 Her depiction of the tension between the entrepreneurial
and conservative forces, as institutionalized through the different constraints placed upon lawyers and judges respectively, is illuminating.
However, by merely describing that tension in general terms she
neither demonstrates why this process will necessarily strike a balance
that "maximizes certainty," rather than reaching a different balance
more inclined to favor change and innovation, nor shows how the degree of certainty reached will be linked to the nature of the issues
involved.
8.

Michael Spicer

Michael Spicer has recently written two articles that apply Austrian concepts to assess governmental behavior. 22 1 In 1993, he published a piece that assessed the implications of Hayek's work for the
conduct of public administration. 22 2 He first discussed Hayek's arguments concerning the significant problems government officials face
in acquiring and using relevant information, and concluded that
217 See id. at 1072.
218 See id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1078.
221 Michael Spicer, On FriedrichHayek and Public Administration: An Argument for
Discretion Within Rules, 25 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 46 (1993) [hereinafter Spicer, PublicAdministration];Michael Spicer, On FriedrichHayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and Majority Rule, 48 NAT'L TAXJ. 103 (1995) [hereinafter Spicer, Taxation].
222 Spicer, Public Administration, supra note 221.
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these difficulties provided support for "the notion that public administrators should be able to exercise significant discretion in the conduct
of their duties." 223 A decentralized system of administration that allows lower-level personnel the latitude to exercise their bestjudgment
would provide a means of utilizing their local knowledge, which
higher political leaders could never acquire and apply even if they
22 4
knew of its existence.
Spicer recognizes, however, that such decentralization would
raise a problem of coordination, and acknowledges that Hayek was
quite sensitive to this problem. 2 25 The key to effective decentralization, in Hayek's view, is that the behavior of the officials must be subject to rules of just conduct 226 that require equal treatment of all
227
persons affected by their exercise of discretion.
In a later 1995 article, Spicer set forth his views of the implications of Hayek's principles for taxation policy. 228 He again emphasized Hayek's Austrian arguments concerning the limitations of
individual knowledge. 2 29 In Spicer's opinion, these inherent limitations, coupled with the uncertainties of tax incidence, work-elasticity,
savings-elasticity, and risk-taking-elasticity inherent in tax policy, and
the further uncertainties associated with the macroeconomic effects
of fiscal policies, together call for a conservative, minimalist stance
with regard to tax reform. 23 0 These knowledge limitations pose very
substantial difficulties for attempts to utilize tax policy to encourage
particular forms of behavior or penalize particular groups of people.
Spicer concludes that Austrian concerns lead to a preference for taxneutrality, in the sense of favoring taxes that are uniform across different economic activities, and for achieving horizontal equity of tax burden across similarly situated individuals. 23 ' From the Austrian
perspective, there is no practical way to apply the insights of so-called
"optimal taxation theory."23 2 Given our radically limited knowledge as
to the results of our tax policies, Spicer concludes that we should
223 Id. at 50-51.
224 See id.
225 Id. at 51.
226 See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text for more discussion of
Hayek's view as to the nature of such rules ofjust conduct.
227 See Spicer, PublicAdministration, supra note 221, at 51-54.
228 Spicer, Taxation, supra note 221.
229 Id. at 104-06.
230 Id. at 111.
231 Id. at 106.
232 Id.

NOTRE

DAME LAW REVIEW[

[VOL- 73:2

strive for the modest, but achievable, goals of predictability and
233
certainty.
While Spicer's arguments are thoughtful and prudent, one could
argue that even if one concedes that tax policy can have significant,
unforeseen, and perhaps unforeseeable consequences, this does not
necessarily counsel for a policy of neutral and horizontally equitable
taxes. First, the unforeseen consequences of a tax measure may well
be beneficial rather than adverse. Spicer may be unduly cautious: the
unknown is merely the unknown, not necessarily the unfavorable.
Second, a neutral and horizontally-equitable tax system will also have
unforeseen consequences, and these consequences may also be adverse. Finally, it seems that there will likely be benefits resulting from
individuals being able to rely upon a stable and predictable tax regime
for planning purposes. However, from a Hayekian perspective, it is
unknown and perhaps unknowable which of the many possible stable
tax regimes will be most beneficial. There is nothing inherent in Austrian theory that necessarily identifies tax-neutrality and horizontal equity as the best "default options," so to speak. Spicer should perhaps
be more candid in recognizing that he is imposing his own particular
attitudes and preferences as to how to deal with unforeseeable possibilities upon the Austrian analytical framework.
C.

Thomas Sowell's Knowledge and Decisions

Thomas Sowell is well known for his provocative books 23

4

and

controversial editorial writings on racial and political issues. In 1980
2 35
Sowell published a theoretical work titled Knowledge and Decisions
that received widespread critical acclaim. 236 While he made few explicit references to Austrian theory in that work, the book is essentially
a translation of Austrian concepts into mainstream political discourse
and an application of those concepts to a broad range of social issues.
The Austrian genesis of Sowell's thinking is made clear by his candid
recognition of the inspiration and guidance provided by Friedrich
Hayek's work that is set forth in the "Acknowledgments" sections of
both the original 1980 edition and the 1996 republication, and in the
233

Id. at 108.

234 See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
POLITICAL Struggle (1987); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW
(1994); THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANNOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A
BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY (1995).
235

SOWELL, supra note 24.
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"Preface" to the republication. 237 Given the stature that this book has
achieved among economists, and its relatively large readership among
members of the wider public, it is somewhat unfortunate for the reputation of the Austrian approach that Sowell did not acknowledge in
more comprehensive and systematic terms its major influence upon
238
his work.

1.

Sowell's General Themes

The central message of Knowledge and Decisions is that social organizations can be better understood if one focuses upon the specific

decision making processes utilized within those organizations rather
than upon their announced goals. 239 The central problem facing
mankind, according to Sowell, is the limitation imposed by the fragmentation of knowledge among individuals, who each possesses only a
minuscule portion of the overall fund of social knowledge. 240 What
really determines the nature of a society is the pattern of incentives
and constraints that the various social institutions utilize to distill

knowledge from opinion and conjecture, shape what knowledge is
brought to bear upon various decisions, guide the decision makers
237 In the Preface to the 1996 republication, Sowell expressly acknowledges his
"intellectual debt" to Friedrich Hayek. SowELL, supranote 33, at xxii. He also notes
there that Hayek's work "has inspired numerous other scholars, writers, activists and
organizations around the world. I am proud to say that he inspired Knowledge and
Decisions...." Id- at xxiii. The Acknowledgments section of both editions also recognized Hayek'.s great influence on Sowell:
If one writing contributed more than any other to the framework within
which this work developed, it would be an essay entitled The Use of Knowledge
in Society, published in the Amefican Economic Review of September 1945, and
written by F. A. Hayek, later to become a Nobel Laureate in economics. In
this plain and apparently simple essay was a deeply penetrating insight into
the way societies function and malfunction, and clues as to why they are so
often and so profoundly misunderstood.
1d. at xxv; SowELL, supra note 24, at ix.
238 Another current popular author who has obviously been influenced to some
significant extent by Austrian thinking, but who has barely acknowledged this influence upon his work, is George Gilder. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, THE SIIT OF ENT=aPRISE 260 (1984) ("The one group of economists most cognizant of entrepreneurs is
the Austrian school .... ."). Gilder's book is much narrower than Thomas Sowell's
work in that it focuses almost exclusively upon the phenomena of business entrepreneurship, and does not employ the broad range of Austrian concepts that Sowell
utilizes.
239 SowELL, supra note 33, at x.
240 Id. at ix.
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who utilize that knowledge, and provide feedback concerning the
24 1
consequences of those decisions.
Sowell thus recognizes the central Austrian insights concerning
the ubiquity of limited knowledge and the importance of maintaining
proper incentives for developing and utilizing new knowledge. He focuses his attention upon the various social processes by which this dispersed knowledge is obtained, assembled, and coordinated. He
makes little if any use of the neoclassical concept of equilibrium; questions of process and coordination take center stage. The close congruence of his approach with the Austrian framework is obvious.
Sowell also reaches typically Austrian conclusions concerning the
marked advantages of decentralized, market-oriented processes over
more centralized and authoritarian mechanisms. He consistently evidences a Hayekian respect for the organic and evolutionary nature of
social processes and institutions, and displays a pronounced distrust of
the consciously rationalized procedures often favored by modem intellectuals. He is in full accord with Hayek in believing that those organizations and institutions that successfully coordinate both
conscious and tacit knowledge, and that thus succeed in winnowing
out truth from falsehood and conjecture, will survive, and over time
displace less effective institutions.
Knowledge and Decisions is a highly insightful and creative work.
Sowell sets a new standard of scholarship in terms of the breadth and
depth of his application of Austrian explanatory and normative principles to aid in understanding and evaluating key social institutions.
Moreover, he goes beyond the standard Austrian framework to also
apply some very useful, non-Austrian analytical concepts which further
24 2
enrich his analysis.
After developing his model of social processes in some detail in
the first half of his book,2 43 Sowell then turns to applications of his
framework in the second half.244 He first briefly discusses some gen-

eral historical trends, 24 5 and then goes into substantially more detail
241

Id. at xxii.

242 For example, Sowell places great stress on the distinction between the "incremental" trade-off oriented form of decision making that characterizes most market
behavior, as opposed to the absolute, "categorical" form of decision making that characterizes governmental-and especially judicial-decisions. Id. at xii-xiii, 21-44. He
also insightfully contrasts the advantages and disadvantages of "informal" and "formal" relationships. Id. at 21-44. He also places greater emphasis upon the role of
"feedback" in the process by which entrepreneurial behavior is guided than have

prior
243
244
245

Austrian writers. Id. at xv-xvii.
Id. at 3-159.
Id. at 163-383.
Id. at 163-66.
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with regard to particular trends in the areas of economics, 2 4 6 politics, 247 and the law.248 While assessment of Sowell's analysis of general

economic and political trends is outside the scope of this article, I will
briefly summarize below his arguments and conclusions regarding the
legal system.
2.

Sowell's Framework Applied to Legal Questions.

The main theme of Sowell's discussion of trends in American law
is that there has been a substantial shift in both the locus and mode of
decision making during the past generation. 249 The trend he sees
(and bewails) is the enlargement of the powers of courts and administrative agencies, at the expense of those of private individuals.2 50 In
his view, this has led to decisions, once made largely in an incremental
manner and based upon knowledge communicated at relatively low
cost through informal mechanisms, now being made in more absolute
and categorical terms, with the flow of relevant knowledge to decision
makers now impeded by rules of evidence designed to provide documentation for third parties.2 51 Moreover, these new decision makers
are much less subject to corrective feedback than were the prior decision makers, and thus the system is more susceptible to continuing on
2 52
a given (and erroneous) course once begun.
He details these trends in a number of areas of law, which I will
only briefly identify here. He first discusses the dramatic expansion of
the number and power of administrative agencies and commissions
that combine executive, legislative, and judicial powers traditionally
kept separate under our constitutional system.2 55 He particularly emphasizes the power of these agencies to withdraw subsidies-now
often vital for firm survival in an environment where a firm's major
competitors are also often governmentally subsidized-as a means of
avoiding constitutional restrictions on discriminatory government behavior.254 He then criticizes recent free speech jurisprudence on the
grounds that the courts have failed to adequately consider the social
246 Id. at 167-228.
247 Id. at 305-83.
248 Id. at 229-304.
249
250
251

Id. at 229.
IdId.

252 Id.
253 Id at 232-37.
254

I&
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costs imposed when they attempt to prescribe substantive results
rather than merely define decision maker boundaries. 2 55
Sowell then offers his thoughts on questions of race in the law.
He first criticizes the "state action doctrine" jurisprudence that has
developed to limit discrimination against minorities as inconsistent
and overly expansive. 2 56 He then advances a rather scathing critique
of affirmative action efforts, arguing that the connections often assumed to exist between racial or ethnic disparities in representation
and invidious discrimination have usually not been proven, and are
often demonstrably false. 257 He challenges the historic Brown v. Board

of Education25 8 decision as resting on the false premise that racially
separate schools are inherently unequal, 259 and uses the history of

school integration and busing efforts to argue that "[t]he ability of
courts to supersede the authority of other institutions is not the same
'2 60
as the ability to achieve the social results aimed at."

Turning to questions of criminal law, Sowell argues that recent
court efforts to improve criminal procedure have ignored the inevitable tradeoffs involved in a criminal justice system, and consequently
have unduly expanded criminals' "due process" rights at a great and
unacknowledged cost to crime victims and society generally. 261 Finally, he advances his view that the proper manner in which the Constitution should be interpreted is in an originalist fashion that treats
the court system largely as an institution for defining and reinforcing
limits on the decision making authority of itself and other actors, and
not as a vehicle for seeking to achieve substantive results through activist measures.

262

All of this analysis, apart from its evident anger and passion, has a
decidedly Austrian flavor to it. Sowell repeatedly argues that it is crucial for a society to locate decision making authority in those social
processes best designed to allow individuals to obtain and utilize the
necessary and dispersed information, and to provide feedback-and
incentives for its effective utilization-concerning the consequences
of decisions. When decisions are removed from the control of market
processes and informal relationships and placed within governmental
agencies or courthouses, the result is poor decisions based upon less
255

Id. at 238-46.

256 Id. at 246-49.
257 Id. at 249-60.
258
259

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
SOWELL, supra note 33, at 264.

260 Id. at 263.
261 Id. at 269-88.
262

Id. at 289-99.
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relevant information, combined with a reduced ability to correct prior
mistakes.2 63 Sowell thus places an Austrian emphasis on the limitations of particular individual decision makers and of the wisdom of
relying whenever possible upon market processes to disseminate
needed information and correct entrepreneurial errors.

m.

AN AusTRiAN FIkiEwORK

FOR ENGAGING IN

THE ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAW

In this part of the Article, I will attempt to outline a coherent
framework of Austrian explanatory concepts and normative premises
that can be used for engaging in the economic analysis of legal rules
and processes. As a first step in that undertaking, in Section A I will
attempt to isolate and identify the central explanatory principles that
have been developed in the recent Austrian law and economics literature summarized above. I will then briefly note the ways in which
those principles were applied by those writers to legal questions. In
Section B, I will attempt to identify the central normative principles
articulated in this recent Austrian literature, and again note the ways
in which those principles were applied. In Section C, I will draw upon
those explanatory and normative concepts in outlining the contours
of an Austrian framework that could provide an alternative to the neoclassical paradigm for engaging in the economic analysis of law.
A.

Austrian Explanations of Legal Rules and Processes

As discussed above, the work done by Austrian writers prior to the
past two decades dealt only tangentially with legal issues, and was primarily of a normative rather than an explanatory character. 264 Those
earlier writers did not attempt to apply the core Austrian concept of
individual action under conditions of ignorance and uncertainty in a
focused effort to explain the contours or evolution of the legal system.
The first comprehensive attempt to consider questions of legal
process and design from an Austrian perspective was probably
Thomas Sowell's 1980 book.2 65 As discussed above, his basic explanatory framework was the standard Austrian model of individual decision making under conditions of ignorance and uncertainty, taking
place within a framework of incentives and constraints defined by the
particular decision making process within which those individuals are
enmeshed.2 66 Sowell recognized that decision making processes are
263

See id. at 299-304.

264 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
265 SowErL, supra note 24.
266 See SoWELL, supra note 33, at ix-xxiii.
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social institutions that are comprised by the collective conduct of the
persons affected, and that they evolve over time in a natural selection
process. He explained many of our recent legal developments as the
consequences of a general movement away from informal decision
making processes to embrace more formal decision making procedures applied by courts and administrative agencies, although he
failed to offer an adequate explanation of what forces have driven this
movement. 2 67 In his view, this shift has impeded the flow of primary
information to decision makers, reduced their sensitivity to corrective
feedback, and resulted in fewer decisions being made in an incremental manner, and more of them being made in categorical terms.
Sowell has thus elaborated in a series of what might be called
"micro-legal" contexts the Austrian insight that the institutional constraints within which individuals act affect their access to new knowledge, their ability to act in an entrepreneurial fashion to utilize that
information, and their opportunities and incentives to learn from and
correct their errors. His explanations as to how particular developments in administrative law, free speech jurisprudence, civil rights law,
and criminal procedure can each be understood as the inevitable outcome of the more centralized and governmental decision making procedures that have been implemented to make social decisions in these
areas is a real breakthrough in Austrian thinking. However, his book
does not fully develop what might be called a "macro-legal" model
that would explain in Austrian terms-in other words, as the dynamic
consequence of entrepreneurial behavior taking place under conditions of ignorance and uncertainty-why this broad shift in the locus
of decision making and change in decision making procedures which
gave rise to the changed pattern of incentives and constraints facing
decision makers took place and still persists.
Turning to the other recent Austrian writers discussed above, the
book by Gerald O'Driscoll and Mario Rizzo 268 develops a general con-

cept of "pattern equilibrium" for use as an over-arching framework for
understanding both the persisting and changing aspects of any network of social relationships. Their book is abstract and theoretical in
its approach, and unlike Sowell's effort does not apply this framework
in detail to any particular aspects of the legal system. However, it does
provide some guidance for the formulation of an equilibrium-like theoretical concept that remains true to the Austrian commitment to
viewing social change as a dynamic process, and how such a concept
might be integrated into an Austrian explanatory framework.
267
268

Id. at 229-304.
O'DRISCOLL & Rizzo, supra note 23.
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Michael DeBow's article utilizes an Austrian framework for explaining the conduct of governmental officials, and incorporates the
key Austrian ideas that such officials will tend to have even more limited knowledge than market participants and will be less motivated to
correct their errors in response to feedback.2 69 His article thus suggests some of the general contours of an Austrian explanation of the
inadequacies of governmental actions.
Thomas Arthur's article 270 utilizes an Austrian model of the competitive process to describe the development of certain market structures and business practices often subject to critical scrutiny and
condemnation under the antitrust laws. His article suggests that Austrian concepts could be rather directly and fruitfully applied to understand the consequences of various forms of governmental regulation
of private business conduct.
Finally, Linda Schwartzstein's 1994 article 27 ' attempts to model
the development of the common law through use of a conventional
Austrian "market discovery" framework applied in the litigation context. Her approach characterizes lawyers as entrepreneurs operating
in a market-like litigation setting before "customer" judges. Her
model sheds light on the litigation process and the incentives litigation creates for the development, diffusion, and retardation of innovations in the common law. Her effort does not, however, go into
enough specific micro-legal detail to enable one to understand how
the particular balance is struck between innovation and stability in any
particular area of law that determines the speed and direction of legal
change. Nor does she explain how the overall macro-legal institutional framework of role expectations that guides lawyers and judges
in their conduct itself evolves over time.
B.

Austrian Normative Criteria

As noted above, the classical Austrian writers such as Mises,
Hayek, and Rothbard strongly embraced freedom from domination as
the central normative premise.2 7 2 In addition, they endorsed legal regimes of stable property rights, freedom of contract, and otherwise
very limited government intervention into private affairs because of
the assumed (though intuitively plausible) connection between such
free market-oriented regimes and entrepreneurial behavior, and ulti269 DeBow, supra note 161.
270 Arthur, supra note 168.
271 Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
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mately the enhancement of human welfare due to the fruits of that
273
entrepreneurial activity.

The later Austrian writers discussed in this Article have essentially
reaffirmed these normative premises and made the same implicit assumptions about the connection between free markets, entrepreneurial dynamism, and human welfare. In some instances they
have applied these premises to offer normative assessments of particular legal rules or policy measures. Mario Rizzo, for example, concluded that strict liability is a preferable regime of tort liability to
negligence. 274 He did so on the bases that 1) strict liability contributes
better to the stability of expectations necessary to encourage entrepreneurship, and 2) the claimed benefits of utilizing negligence principles to allocate liability on the basis of ex ante comparative costs of
precautions are chimerical given the absence of the information necessary to make such determinations. 275 Gerald O'Driscoll and Roy
276
Cordato each came to the same conclusion for similar reasons.
Christopher Wonnell, as another example, subjected certain contract law doctrines such as impracticability, fraud by non-disclosure,
and unconscionability to Austrian normative scrutiny by considering
their consequences for "entrepreneurial perceptiveness" and concluded that from an Austrian viewpoint some of these defenses were
less desirable than they appeared to be when viewed from a neoclassical perspective. 277 Roy Cordato has applied Austrian normative concepts to reject the use of a Coasian framework of analysis for resolving
property law disputes, arguing that fidelity to prior assignments of
rights should take precedence over neoclassical efficiency considerations. 2 78 He also concluded that it is inappropriate for governments
to intervene in market processes to attempt to internalize either positive or negative externalities. 279 Finally, Michael Spicer proposed evaluating public administration regimes by their ability to allow lowerlevel administrators to exercise significant discretion while still abiding by impersonal rules ofjust conduct. 2 0 He also suggested judging
tax policy largely on the basis of its ability to achieve predictability and
273

See id.

274

Rizzo, Law, supra note 73.

275 Id.
276 O'Driscoll, supra note 23; Cordato, supra note 23.
277 Wonnell, supra note 103.
278 CORDATO, supra note 23, at 92-110.
279 Id. at 15-37.
280

Spicer, Public Administration, supra note 221.
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certainty given the unforeseeability of the consequences of tax poli28 1
cies with differential impacts.
Some of these more recent writers have also made efforts towards
developing a more general criterion for assessing the normative consequences of policies that might serve a role in an Austrian framework
analogous to that played by the efficiency criteria in the neoclassical
paradigm. Such an effort is daunting, however, given the Austrian
distaste for equilibrium concepts and given the emphasis Austrians
place on the continuing dynamic (and often unforeseeable) effects of
a policy.
Roy Cordato, for example, has posited concepts of "social efficiency" and "catallactic efficiency" that focus upon a policy's impacts
on the ability of individuals to pursue their objectives efficiently and
with minimal conflict. 28 2 His discussions of these criteria do not, however, address the central questions of how and at what point in time
such effects are to be measured or how those effects are to be aggregated across differently-affected persons. He therefore provides only
a first step towards the development of such a criterion. Similarly,
while Linda Schwartzstein in her recent work has identified "certainty" and "flexibility" as criteria that should be incorporated in an
Austrian normative standard,2 83 she has not formulated a precise criterion that would encompass the inevitable tradeoffs that exist between these objectives, either for a particular individual or for society
at large.
C. An Austrian Frameworkfor Explaining and EvaluatingLegal Regimes
Viewed as a whole, this body of recent work suggests several principles that should be incorporated in any attempt to design an Austrian framework for understanding and evaluating the legal process.
First of all, a basic micro-legal model should be formulated which is
sufficiently general and flexible to be used to characterize any situation that is being studied as though it was comprised of rational individuals, each alert to entrepreneurial opportunities, seeking to
continually maximize their satisfactions over time in a dynamic process. That model should reflect that those individuals operate under
conditions of ignorance and uncertainty that are continually modified
by their new learning that results from their actions, with their preferences also evolving over time as a result of their experiences, and that
281
282
283

Spicer, Taxation, supra note 221.
CORDATO, supra note 23, at 57-117; Cordato, supra note 121, at 237-44.
Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1066-78.
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those individuals are subject to constraints of income and technological possibility that, once again, evolve endogenously over time.
The relatively stable behavioral regularities that exist in the particular situation being studied through the application of such a
model should be identified and characterized as the more enduring
institutional constraints-the "pattern equilibrium" of the situation in
O'Driscoll and Rizzo's terms. The persons playing the central entrepreneurial roles in the situation, and the dimensions of their freedom for entrepreneurial action within these pattern equilibrium
constraints, need to be identified. All of these specifications should
be done in as rigorous a fashion as possible, although given the Austrian recognition of the inherent unpredictability of the future and
the admittedly counterfactual nature of the pattern equilibrium assumption, it would be unwise to attempt to reduce such a model to a
neoclassical-style set of mathematical expressions or geometric
depictions.
As is demonstrated by the previously discussed literature, such an
Austrian micro-legal model of the legal process could be applied to
explain social behavior in a number of contexts at least as well as does
the neoclassical paradigm and, in addition, may help to identify and
trace the effects of significant factors that the neoclassical framework
is unable to recognize. This advantage is easier to appreciate if one
views the Austrian approach as being essentially a more comprehensive and realistic generalization of the limited neoclasssical framework. If, for example, one utilizes the radically simplifying
assumption of a stable and widely known pattern equilibrium of a sort
that strongly reinforces the security of property and contractual rights
and effectively promotes broad dissemination of economically relevant information, the Austrian model could be applied to market settings in a conventional, neoclassical fashion to explain the processes
of price and output determination and how they are affected by
changes in the legal rules affecting entitlements. This particular simplifying assumption would therefore serve to essentially collapse the
Austrian model into the basic neoclassical supply and demand framework, just as certain simplifying assumptions introduced in a modern
physics model to eliminate relativistic or quantum mechanics complications would collapse the subsequent analysis into a more simple
Newtonian form. The neoclassical paradigm can thus be seen in
proper perspective as simply being a useful limiting case of the more
inclusive Austrian framework-essentially bearing the same relation
to the latter approach as Newtonian physics bears to quantum
mechanics or to the theory of relativity-and not in fundamental conflict with it as some writers from each camp have at times suggested.
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However, Austrian models could also be applied with less restrictive pattern equilibrium assumptions to market settings to illuminate
the more complex processes of innovation, product differentiation,
reverse engineering and copying, entrepreneurial initiatives, and
transactions at non-equilibrium prices that the neoclassical model
tends to ignore or at least obscure. They could also be used to help
understand the behavior of governmental officials (or other members
of organizations) that are acting within pattern equilibriums involving
legal and other constraints that exist in non-market settings. They
could illuminate how rules can create or limit entrepreneurial opportunities and provide or limit feedback and the incentives to alter behavior in response to that feedback. Finally, Austrian models could be
applied to better understand both the common law and legislative
processes of law-making by depicting the entrepreneurial opportunities and pattern equilibrium constraints inherent in those contexts
and playing out their implications.
The prior literature provides much less guidance for the truly
herculean effort of developing a macro-legal model along Austrian
lines that could explain the broader social processes that shape major
legal trends. From a macro-legal Austrian perspective that encompasses broad collections of individuals and a substantial period of
time, it seems difficult or impossible to meaningfilly define a stable
institutional structure of behavioral regularities. However, without assuming some stable and exogenously determined social constraints
upon behavior, it is hard to see how any concrete predictions are to be
generated or how any possible explanations are to be ruled out. It
may simply be the case that if one accepts the Austrian premise that
human behavior is to some significant extent undetermined and
"free," one then cannot offer explanations of more than local and
temporary validity.
Both macroeconomics and other forms of grand-scale social theorizing thus appear from an Austrian perspective to be rather quixotic
enterprises. Despite this apparent inability to offer comprehensive,
large-scale explanations or predictions, Austrian macro-legal thinking
may still be able to play a valuable "trashing" role in legal analysis. 28 4
Persons advocating a legal change often argue not only that the proposed change will have local and immediate beneficial impacts, but
also make more sweeping assertions as to its broader and longer-term
positive effects. The Austrian framework is particularly well-suited for
demonstrating how speculative and problematic such larger assertions
are likely to be, and how many dynamic social processes must be as284 See generally Mark G. Kelman, Trashing,36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984).
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sumed to be unchanging, or changing in only foreseeable ways, for
those assertions to be plausible.
Turning to questions of assessment, the Austrian normative writing, though relatively limited in both its scope and depth, does provide some guidance-primarily of a cautionary sort-to one seeking
to formulate a comprehensive evaluative criterion. Those writers
strongly suggest that any criterion utilized for assessment of the operation of a legal regime should focus primarily upon the extent to which
that regime promotes a social process which enhances individual freedom and facilitates the exercise of entrepreneurial choice in markets
or market-like contexts. 285 Such a focus identifies at least two desirable properties of such a criterion. First, all other things being equal,
stable legal regimes appear intuitively to further these objectives more
than do unstable regimes that increase uncertainty and thereby impede planning efforts, so the criterion should ideally reward rules for
their positive effects upon indicia of legal stability. Second, more flexible legal regimes, again assuming all other things are equal, would
also appear to further these objectives better than would more rigid
frameworks, since they would allow individual actors greater latitude
to utilize local knowledge and tailor their conduct to the specific situations they face. The criterion should therefore ideally reward rules
that can be shown to enhance flexibility of action.
Concluding that an Austrian normative standard should incorporate both the stability and the flexibility aspects of a legal regime, however, only serves to bring one to the threshold of a large number of
truly difficult problems involved in formulating such a criterion, even
if one assumes that no other properties of a legal regime beyond its
stability and flexibility merit consideration. First, and most obviously,
how is one to measure in quantitative terms such inherently multidimensional properties as the "stability" or "flexibility" of a given law
or legal regime with regard to the circumstances faced by particular
affected individuals?
285

See also Alan P. Hamlin, On the Possibility of Austrian Welfare Economics, in AusDIRECrIONS, supranote 60, at 193 (Bruce Cald-

TRIAN ECONOMIcs: TENSIONS AND NEW

well & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992).

This Austrian concern with the operating characteristics of processes, rather
than their particular outcomes, provides the basis for an Austrian welfare
economics. The central point here is that while a genuinely Austrian welfare

economics cannot set out to evaluate states of the world seen as outcomes, it
could set out to evaluate alternative institutional and procedural structures
in terms of their feasibility and general operating properties.
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Second, even if a legal regime's stability and flexibility for a given
individual can be measured and quantified, it is not clear how the
effects of these properties upon that individual are to be valued if one
is to remain true to the Austrian perspective. Austrians are unwilling
to assume the existence of stable individual preferences that are unaffected by the consequences of the imposition of a legal regime or to
assume that individuals will have complete knowledge of the contours
of that regime. An Austrian normative criterion would therefore also
have to incorporate some mechanism for ascertaining the degree of
each individual's knowledge of a legal regime, and the impact of that
knowledge upon that individual's preferences.
Third, it seems clear that there is often a tradeoff between the
stability of a legal regime and the flexibility of action it affords at least
some of the individuals governed by it. In such instances, how will the
consequences of the legal regime for each of those individuals whose
freedom is simultaneously enhanced and constrained in different ways
be assessed? An Austrian criterion would need to have some means
for balancing these offsetting impacts to reach an overall assessment
of the impacts upon each of these individuals.
Fourth, even if a quantified measure of the impacts of a legal
regime on each affected individual can be obtained, how will the impacts on different individuals be aggregated into an overall social assessment? Some persons will likely be benefited and other persons
will be injured. How will we decide whether the impacts are on balance desirable? All of the issues raised by the use of the Kaldor-Hicks
wealth maximization criterion that is used in the neoclassical framework in an attempt to avoid the interpersonal utility comparison problem would have to be addressed in some fashion here as well.
Finally, looming over all of these other difficulties is the time of
measurement problem which is particularly acute in the Austrian
framework. Unlike the more static neoclassical paradigm that specifies a precise equilibrium end-state when the full consequences of a
measure are to be assessed, the Austrian approach envisions a continuing dynamic process that never reaches such a stable equilibrium.
This dynamic conception would appear to rule out the formulation of
a criterion that would allow for making definitive normative assessments of the consequences of a policy at any single point in time.
These problems involved in developing a quantifiable Austrian
normative criterion are obviously immense and probably insurmountable. Ludwig Mises and Friedrich Hayek were forthright in recognizing that Austrian principles are incompatible with the use of
mathematical models to predict the economic consequences of policies; current Austrians need to be similarly candid concerning the im-
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plications of their approach for quantitative normative assessment.
They should frankly acknowledge that their unwillingness to make
radically simplifying behavioral assumptions, analogous to those of the
neoclassical framework, renders it impossible to formulate a quantitative welfare criterion that can play a role comparable to that served by
the efficiency criteria under the neoclassical paradigm. They cannot
have it both ways.
For better or worse, "welfare economics" as conventionally understood in Pigouvian or Coasian terms is not a game that Austrians can
play. Efforts such as those engaged in by Roy Cordato and Linda
Schwartzstein to develop a criterion labeled "efficiency" of one sort or
another, but which in an Austrian framework cannot serve any of the
functions played by the efficiency criterion in the neoclassical system,
seem to be misdirected. Austrians may well find it inconvenient to
have nothing of interest to say at gatherings of economists or policy
makers where the "efficiency" of alternative policies is being discussed. Unfortunately, that is one of the unavoidable costs of embracing an alternative paradigm that encompasses much of the richness
and complexity of life, but that does not make the heroic simplifying
assumptions necessary to obtain such precise measures of performance. 28 6 In economic theory as elsewhere, there are, unfortunately,
no free lunches.
However, it may still be possible for Austrians to develop a
"softer," non-quantitative normative standard focusing upon process
characteristics rather than end-state outcomes that is entirely consistent with their premises, yet still provides a modest degree of discernment across alternatives that goes beyond the traditional Austrian
blanket endorsement of free market-enhancing policies and condemnation of all other measures. While such a normative standard would
not have anywhere near the "precision" (which to the Austrians is entirely spurious 28 7) of the neoclassical efficiency criterion, it could still

provide useful guidance for making certain kinds of policy choices.
This author would therefore encourage Austrian writers to continue
their efforts along these lines, but to consciously limit themselves to
developing an approach for the valuation of process characteristics.
They should seek a fuller explication of the connections between market processes and the enhancement of human welfare and not waste
their energy attempting to formulate an "efficiency" criterion.
286 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, and the accompanying text; Leff, supra note 2,
and the accompanying text.
287 See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 4, and the accompanying text.
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF T=E
TO THE

ECONOIc

AusTRiAN APPROACH

ANALYSIS OF LAW

To one who has patiently read this far, it should be clear that this
author believes that the holistic (or, to its derogators, "complicationist"28 8 ) Austrian approach is quite valuable because its particular

strengths complement very well the weaknesses of the highly reductionist neoclassical framework. Either paradigm when viewed in isolation has obvious and severe shortcomings, but the two approaches
when considered in conjunction provide about all that can be asked
of the theoretical enterprise. Both approaches consequently have
28 9
their roles to play in explaining and evaluating social phenomena.
The neoclassical models, as previously discussed, operate at a relatively high level of abstraction, making possible the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques to derive quantitative predictions and
rendering diverse impacts commensurable for overall normative assessments. Sometimes such precise predictions and broad normative
assessments are needed and neoclassical models are well-nigh indispensable. Their heroic simplifying assumptions, however, put one at
substantial risk of overlooking essential aspects of the area of inquiry
and may result in spuriously precise predictions of little relevance to
actual circumstances, or in incomplete evaluations, or both.
Austrian models, with their emphasis on dynamic processes and
their richer and more realistic depictions of the human condition,
largely avoid these dangers of oversimplification, misaggregation, and
normative over-simplification. These are obviously major advantages.
Austrians certainly cannot be accused of "tunnel vision"290 or of embracing "oversimplification" 29 1 or a "pretense of knowledge." 292 On
the other hand, Austrians pay a steeper price for these advantages
then they have sometimes been willing to admit. The Austrian explanatory framework can generally only provide, at most, suggestive
descriptions and predictions, and not detailed, quantifiable forecasts.
Austrian models resemble flashlights whose translucent lenses dimly
illuminate a large area of ground rather than sending forth a bright
but narrow beam of light. Sometimes such broad but dim illumina288

See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, and the accompanying text.
289 The clearest analogy this author can present is that of the wildlife photographer, who needs to carry both a wide-angle lens and a close-up zoom lens in his camera bag, and uses the one that best fits the circumstances that he encounters.
290 See, e.g., Leff, supra note 2, at 477, and the accompanying text.
291 See, e.g., HUNDERT, supra note 3, at Part One frontispiece, and the accompanying text (quotingJ.L. Austin).
292 See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 4, at 272, and the accompanying text.
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tion of social processes is sufficient, but at other times clear detail is
essential.
In addition, the resolving power of any Austrian normative criteria that have thus far been proposed is quite limited. Beyond offering
a general endorsement of stable private property rights regimes and
reliance upon consensual market processes rather than authoritarian
directives as social coordination mechanisms, the Austrian normative
framework is rather vapid. It has insufficient "bite" to provide meaningful guidance with regard to any social decisions except for the most
fundamental markets versus comprehensive central planning social
choices. These normative assessment problems, moreover, appear to
be inherent in the complex nature of the analytical framework and in
the Austrian commitment to incorporate time and uncertainty in a
serious manner. Of course, Austrians can always respond that the
seemingly more tractable neoclassical efficiency criteria "solve" these
difficulties only by assuming away these very complexities and thereby
provide meaningless and misleading assessments.
For the legal scholar or law reformer who regularly utilizes neoclassical economic concepts in his work, therefore, some facility with
Austrian modes of explanation and assessment is an essential skill. Besides providing a helpful check on exactly the sorts of errors of omission and oversimplification to which neoclassical analyses are prone,
even when conducted by experts, the Austrian framework can serve to
strengthen one's peripheral social vision, so to speak, to reveal additional areas of fruitful inquiry and lurking normative issues. Once revealed, those avenues of inquiry and normative questions can then be
probed more closely with the more focused neoclassical tools.
Moreover, the Austrian framework can also be of great value to
many other legal scholars who do not currently utilize neoclassical
economic concepts in their work, or who do so only sparingly. Two
significant groups of academics who may be able to make particularly
good use of Austrian concepts are the members of the law-and-society
movement and those scholars associated with the emerging interdisciplinary field of socio-economics.
As Robert Ellickson has well described, there is currently a great
chasm between law-and-economics scholars and the members of the
law-and-society movement. 293 The latter group has its academic roots
293 ROBERT
6-8 (1991).

ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUr LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETLE DisPUTS

They publish separate journals. They gather at separate conferences.
They seem rarely to read, much less to cite, work by loyalists of the other
camp.... To exaggerate only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe
that the law-and-society group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor,
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not in economics but instead in the more humanistic social sciences
such as history, sociology, and anthropology.2 9 4 Law-and-society scholars tend to regard human behavior as highly variable and contingent
on historical circumstances 295 and consequently find little occasion to
make use of the abstract neoclassical models favored by law-and-economics scholars. The Austrian approach, it would appear, could perhaps provide a "bridge" between these two different theoretical
orientations, in that it rests upon the same core premises and analytical categories as the neoclassical framework, 29 6 yet incorporates the
richness of life and complexity and contingency of human behavior in
a comprehensive fashion. On the other hand, the extreme methodological individualism and commitment to libertarian premises of
most Austrians may be somewhat off-putting to many law-and-society
scholars.
A substantial number of legal scholars have recently expressed
sufficient interest in the principles that underlie the interdisciplinary
field of socio-economics, 297 and have signed a petition that has led to
the formation of an Association of American Law Schools Section on
Socio-Economics. 298 Those scholars have generally embraced the neoand the law-and-society scholars believe that the law-and-economics theorists
are not only out of touch with reality but also short on humanity. (footnote
omitted).

Id.
294

See idt

295 See id
296 See supra Part IA.
297 A succinct description of the core principles of socio-economics that makes
clear their broad overlap with Austrian concepts is presented in SECTION ON SocioEcoNoMIcs NEwsL-=-rER (Association of Am. Law. Schs.), Nov. 1996.
Socio-economics begins with the assumption that economics is not a
self-contained system, but is embedded in society, polity, and culture. Drawing upon economics, sociology, political science, psychology, anthropology,
philosophy, history, law, and management, socio-economics regards competitive behavior as a subset of human behavior within a social context that both
enables and constrains competition and cooperation.
Unique among interdisciplinary approaches, however, socio-economics
recognizes the pervasive and powerful influence of the neoclassical paradigm on twentieth century thought, and seeks to examine its assumptions,
develop a rigorous understanding of its limitations, improve upon its application, and develop alternative, perhaps complementary, approaches that
are predictive, exemplary, and morally sound.

Id. at 4.
298 That petition was signed by 120 law professors from 50 AALS member schools.
Id.
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classical paradigm to a greater extent than have most of the law-andsociety scholars, but many of them have long been troubled by its reductionist assumptions and are actively seeking to develop complementary approaches of a broader sort. 299 The Austrian framework
would appear to be almost ideally suited to their needs, particularly if
a variant can be developed that attenuates this connection with libertarian political premises.
While it is therefore important for legal scholars of many different persuasions to understand and make use of the Austrian insights,
it is perhaps even more important that law students be formally introduced to the Austrian framework in their law-and-economics courses.
A scholar who regularly applies neoclassical economic principles to
legal questions in a thorough and critical fashion will likely independently reach a number of the more central Austrian insights as to the
limitations of his tools, even if he is unaware that he is, in effect, reinventing a conceptual wheel that has a long and respected tradition.
A neophyte law student who has had little economics background beyond sophomore-level Microeconomics 101, however, is not likely to
develop an understanding and appreciation of the Austrian counterpoint to the more austere neoclassical analyses that are presented to
him unless substantial class time is specifically devoted to that end.
Unfortunately, very few teachers of law-and-economics courses now incorporate an Austrian module; this needs to change.
Law professors who attempt to incorporate Austrian concepts
into their courses, either in discrete modules or pervasively, are likely
to find that those ideas are relatively quickly grasped and well-received. This should not come as a surprise; the Austrian premises are
in fact much closer to common understandings of human psychology
and social dynamics than are the more heroic and austere neoclassical
premises. It thus is actually less of an intellectual step for students to
embrace Austrian principles than it is for them to accept the less intuitive premises of the neoclassical paradigm. Professors who punctuate
their presentations with Austrian perspectives on the issues will likely
encounter less skepticism than one sometimes faces when demonstrating the often highly counter-intuitive implications of neoclassical explanatory models and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency assessments.
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of economic principles in legal analysis is now pervasive
and is recognized as leading to valuable insights otherwise not easily
299

See, e.g., supra note 297.
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obtained. Virtually all of this law-and-economics analysis, however, is
confined to applications of highly reductionist and static neoclassical
models that abstract severely from essential features of the human
condition and the social process. The Austrian tradition, in contrast,
is based upon a conception of society as a complex and dynamic process, constituted by individuals with malleable preferences and acting
through time under conditions of ignorance and pervasive uncertainty and subject to an institutional order that is in continuous evolution. Laws are evaluated in this framework in accordance with their
impact on the process by which these individuals are able to coordinate their efforts to achieve their objectives, not through a comparison of equilibrium end-state outcomes.
Over the past two decades there have been a number of efforts by
Austrian writers to apply their approach to legal questions. While
much remains to be accomplished in this research program, a
number of insights have been obtained that collectively provide a valuable perspective from which to assess and counterbalance the limitations of the neoclassical paradigm as a tool of legal analysis. It is by
now clear that the Austrian approach can be of great value to legal
scholars of many different persuasions and to lawyers generally. One
can only hope that the neoclassical and Austrian traditions will come
to be regarded as complementary rather than conflicting approaches
for applying economic principles to legal issues and that legal scholarship and education will no longer overlook the Austrian contribution.
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